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ARTICLES 
 
Private Enforcement in 
Administrative Courts 
Michael Sant’Ambrogio* 
Scholars debating the relative merits of public and private 
enforcement have long trained their attention on the federal courts. For 
some, laws giving private litigants rights to vindicate important 
policies generate unaccountable “private attorneys general” who 
interfere with public enforcement goals. For others, private lawsuits 
save cash-strapped government lawyers money, time, and resources by 
encouraging private parties to police misconduct on their own. Yet 
largely overlooked in the debate is enforcement inside agency 
adjudication, which often is depicted as just another form of public 
enforcement, only in a friendlier forum.  
This Article challenges the prevailing conception of 
administrative enforcement. Based on a comprehensive examination of 
over eighty administrative courts, I find that agencies rarely enforce on 
their own. Among other things, private parties may have procedural 
rights to file regulatory complaints, trigger agency investigations, 
 
 * Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. I wish to thank Michael 
Asimow, Kent Barnett, Rachel Barkow, Emily Cauble, Cary Coglianese, Emily Hammond, Lisa 
Heinzerling, Michael Herz, Jon Michaels, Noga Morag-Levine, Nick Parrillo, Jason Parkin, Peter 
Shane, Cathy Sharkey, Glen Staszewski, Christopher Walker, Adam S. Zimmerman, and the 
participants in the Administrative Law New Scholarship Roundtable for helpful discussions and 
comments on earlier drafts of this Article. 
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demand evidentiary hearings, join public enforcement actions as 
parties, and even pursue claims without the involvement of the agency’s 
enforcement arm. Although some administrative enforcement is 
virtually indistinguishable from either public or private enforcement in 
federal court, more often administrative schemes employ attributes of 
both.  
Combining public and private enforcement furthers the goals of 
agency adjudication while mitigating some of the dangers posed by 
transferring cases from generalist courts to specialized policymaking 
bodies with less formal procedures. Public enforcement offers greater 
political accountability and more coherent implementation of policy. 
Private enforcement supplements agency expertise with the situated 
knowledge of regulatory beneficiaries and enhances their access to legal 
remedies. And diversifying enforcement inputs reduces the risk of 
political or interest group capture of administrative schemes. These 
tools are especially valuable today, as presidential administrations 
increasingly use control over public enforcement to roll back statutory 
mandates they cannot repeal through the legislative process. Enhanced 
procedural rights for private parties can reduce capture of statutory 
mandates, highlight undue influence, and facilitate judicial review of 
policy changes implemented through agency nonenforcement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The end of the twentieth century witnessed a dramatic 
increase in the number of private enforcement actions in federal court: 
Congress wrote scores of statutes with express private rights of action; 
for a time, courts regularly interpreted statutes to include implied 
private rights of action; and to this day, private parties continue to use 
them. As one rough proxy of the relative importance of private 
enforcement, last year the United States was a plaintiff in only 3,298 
of the 179,308 complaints asserting statutory claims filed in federal 
district courts.1 Thus, enforcement in federal court is dominated by 
private plaintiffs. 
The situation is very different in agency adjudication, where 
the government is ubiquitous. Administrative law struggles with 
separation of powers issues that arise when the same agency that 
drafts regulations also enforces them and adjudicates disputes over 
enforcement.2 Critics of the administrative state argue that executive 
enforcement in executive courts violates the Constitution and long-
standing principles of Anglo-American law.3 Thus, the picture of 
enforcement in administrative courts4 that emerges from the 
 
 1. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C-2 
(June 30, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/file/24702/download [https://perma.cc/BC8N-B2HQ] 
[hereinafter JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (June 30, 2018)].  
 2. The major administrative law casebooks devote significant real estate to how agencies 
separate their executive and judicial functions. See, e.g., MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, 
STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 124–37, 154–55 (4th ed. 2014); STEPHEN G. BREYER 
ET. AL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 711–741 
(7th ed. 2011); RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 668–76 (7th 
ed. 2016); WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND 
CASES 220–21 (5th ed. 2014); GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 290–300 (7th ed. 
2016).  
 3. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 228 (2014) 
(criticizing the executive’s use of administrative courts to pursue enforcement actions against 
private parties); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
1231, 1246–47 (1994) (distinguishing between constitutional agency adjudications of “mere 
privilege[s]” and unconstitutional agency adjudications of claims related to deprivations of “life, 
liberty, or property”). 
 4. This Article uses the term “administrative court” to mean a body within a federal 
agency that adjudicates cases or claims. Thus, “administrative courts” and “agency adjudication” 
are often used interchangeably. 
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literature could not be more different than private enforcement in 
federal court: administrative enforcement is just another form of 
public enforcement, only in a friendlier forum.5  
Or is it? 
It is true that Congress nearly always creates a role for public 
enforcers when it creates an administrative scheme.6 Yet a closer 
examination of administrative enforcement reveals that agencies are 
rarely the only parties involved in enforcement. Private parties also 
typically play a significant role.7 Across the administrative state, 
private parties have rights to file regulatory complaints, to trigger 
agency investigations, to call for evidentiary hearings, to intervene in 
public enforcement actions, and even to pursue enforcement actions 
with or without the involvement of the agency’s enforcement arm.8 
The expansion of private rights of action in federal court gave 
rise to a robust debate regarding the relative merits of public versus 
private enforcement of public policy. Advocates of “private attorneys 
general”9 claim that private enforcement supplements the limited 
resources of public enforcers, harnesses the knowledge of private 
parties regarding regulatory violations, and reduces the costs of 
agency inaction due to regulatory capture, political constraints, or 
bureaucratic ossification.10 Yet others worry that private enforcement 
undermines the political accountability of public policy, risks 
overdeterrence and inconsistent regulation, and threatens a public 
enforcer’s carefully calibrated enforcement policy.11 Consequently, 
some scholars call for greater agency control over private enforcement 
actions brought in federal court.12  
 
 5. See sources cited infra note 13. 
 6. See infra Section II.B. 
 7. See infra Section II.C. 
 8. See infra Section II.C and Appendix A. 
 9. The term was coined by Judge Jerome Frank in Associated Industries of New York 
State, Inc. v. Ickes. See 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943) 
(“Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals.”). 
 10. See infra Section I.B. 
 11. See infra Section I.C. 
 12. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1129, 1181 (2016) (suggesting agencies “devise the appropriate scope of private rights of action” 
in federal court to prevent them from upsetting agency enforcement policies); David Freeman 
Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616 (2013) (analyzing gatekeeping 
of private enforcement in federal court); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private 
Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 97 
(2005) (arguing that Congress should “delegate the authority to create private rights of action to 
the executive agencies charged with administering the relevant statutes”).  
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Largely overlooked in this debate is private enforcement in 
agency adjudication. While scholars have focused on the choice 
between a public and private enforcer in federal court, they have said 
little about the same choice in agency adjudication or why 
policymakers might incorporate aspects of both public and private 
enforcement in administrative courts. When the literature does 
discuss administrative enforcement, it generally assumes an agency 
will pursue enforcement and distinguishes that enforcement from 
private enforcement regimes.13  
Perhaps this oversight should not be surprising. Agency 
adjudication has received less attention in recent years than 
rulemaking or enforcement in federal court.14 Just as Congress and 
the courts were opening the federal courthouse to private enforcement 
actions, scholars were preoccupied with “the rise of rulemaking” by 
federal agencies.15 Meanwhile, for many years, the Supreme Court 
struggled with the constitutional limits of Congress’s power to 
delegate disputes between private parties to non–Article III tribunals. 
Some Justices even suggested that only cases with the government on 
one side of the “v” qualified as “public rights” cases that could be 
adjudicated outside of Article III.16 In addition, much of the 
 
 13. See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE 
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 8 (2010) (“When . . . the Department of Labor undertakes enforcement 
action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, it constitutes the archetypal exercise of state 
capacity.”); id. at 33 (“[P]rivate enforcement regimes . . . use the judiciary as an infrastructure for 
implementation of their agenda.”); HAMBURGER, supra note 3, at 228 (criticizing public 
enforcement actions against private parties); Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 
LEWIS & CLARK. L. REV. 637, 641 (2013) (recognizing private enforcement in foreign 
administrative tribunals but not in the United States); Lawson, supra note 3, at 1248 (“Consider 
the typical enforcement activities of a typical federal agency—for example, of the Federal Trade 
Commission.”). But see 2 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5:31 (3d 
ed. 2010) (explaining that in “[m]any administrative adjudications . . . someone outside of 
government instigates administrative action by taking advantage of an opportunity, exercising a 
right, or raising an important issue”); Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Theories of Agency Adjudication 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing three models of agency adjudication 
and distinguishing between public and private enforcement actions). 
 14. But see Michael Asimow, Five Models of Administrative Adjudication, 63 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 3 (2015) (proposing a methodology for classifying different types of agency adjudication); 
Michael Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action, 126 YALE L.J. 
1634 (2017); Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
805 (2015). 
 15. Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 
1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139, 1140 (2001) (“Although rulemaking had been around 
for decades, it was only at the end of the 1960s that agencies turned to it as the primary staple of 
administrative action.”). 
 16. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 503 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I adhere to my 
view, however, that—our contrary precedents notwithstanding—‘a matter of public 
rights . . . must at a minimum arise between the government and others.’ ” (quoting 
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scholarship on agency adjudication has focused on government 
benefits, which continue to comprise the bulk of cases decided by 
agencies.17  
The Court resolved at least some of its ambivalence concerning 
agency adjudication of disputes between private parties in Stern v. 
Marshall.18 Even as the Court limited the circumstances in which 
non–Article III courts may decide common law claims,19 it seemed to 
approve agency adjudication of claims arising under regulatory 
statutes, regardless of the parties involved, and rejected a public 
rights doctrine limiting non–Article III courts to actions involving the 
government as a party.20 And just this year, in Oil States Energy 
Services v. Greene’s Energy Group, the Court rejected Article III and 
Seventh Amendment challenges to the authority of the Patent Trial 
and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) to adjudicate the validity of patents in 
disputes between private parties.21 Beyond the constitutional 
questions raised in Stern and Oil States, however, few have examined 
the relationship between public and private enforcement in agency 
adjudication. Thus, the time is ripe for a deeper examination of the 
role of private parties in administrative enforcement. 
This Article begins that project. First, on a descriptive level, 
the Article challenges the perception of regulatory enforcement in 
agency adjudication as merely an administrative form of public 
enforcement.22 Based on a comprehensive review of the Federal 
Administrative Adjudication Database, a joint project of the 
Administrative Conference of the United States (“ACUS”) and 
 
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 65 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment))). 
 17. See infra notes 83–88 and accompanying text. 
 18. 564 U.S. 462. 
 19. Id. at 484 (“[W]e have long recognized that, in general, Congress may not ‘withdraw 
from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common 
law, or in equity, or admiralty.’ ” (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 
59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855))). 
 20. Id. at 490–91: 
The Court has continued . . . to limit the [public rights] exception to cases in which the 
claim at issue derives from a federal regulatory scheme, or in which resolution of the 
claim by an expert Government agency is deemed essential to a limited regulatory 
objective within the agency’s authority. In other words, it is still the case that what 
makes a right “public” rather than private is that the right is integrally related to 
particular Federal Government action.; 
see also Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015) (affirming Stern and 
permitting adjudication by the Bankruptcy Court of even “Stern claims” with the consent of the 
parties). 
 21. 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018). 
 22. See sources cited supra note 13. 
Sant’Ambrogio_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/26/2019  2:13 PM 
432 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2:425 
 
Stanford Law School,23 and dozens of agency rules of practice and 
procedure, the Article maps the rights of public and private parties 
across a broad universe of administrative enforcement schemes. It 
finds that many administrative schemes combine attributes of both 
public and private enforcement. 
Second, on a theoretical level, the Article explores the function 
of hybrid enforcement, opening up new lines of inquiry about how 
Congress should balance public and private interests in agency 
adjudication. Agency adjudication seeks to achieve three main goals: 
(1) greater access to legal remedies for parties facing obstacles in 
court, (2) more accurate and expeditious decisionmaking informed by 
specialized expertise, and (3) implementation of more coherent and 
politically accountable regulatory policies. But the tools used to 
achieve these goals—informal procedures, specialized decisionmakers, 
and political supervision—pose risks to the legitimacy of 
administrative courts. Combining elements of public and private 
enforcement can facilitate the goals of agency adjudication while 
allaying some of the concerns raised by these tools.  
Indeed, the legitimacy of agency adjudication may depend on 
its ability to maintain a delicate balance between its public and 
private character. Tilting agency adjudication too far in the direction 
of a pure public enforcement scheme may undermine its legitimacy as 
a dispute resolution mechanism outside federal court. At the same 
time, tilting too far in the direction of private enforcement fails to take 
advantage of the ability of public enforcement to implement a more 
coherent, coordinated, and politically accountable policy. Agency 
designers must strike the appropriate balance in each administrative 
scheme based on the types of claims the agency hears. 
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I lays out the 
respective roles, benefits, and costs of public and private enforcement 
in federal court. Based on a review of the organic statutes and rules of 
practice and procedure of eighty-seven agencies included in the ACUS-
Stanford Adjudication Database, Part II then maps the attributes of 
public and private enforcement in a broad universe of regulatory 
schemes. Administrative enforcement includes a wide-ranging mix of 
public and private enforcement tools. Some administrative schemes 
resemble public enforcement in federal court; others approximate 
private enforcement actions. But much administrative enforcement 
falls somewhere between these two poles. 
 
 23. Federal Administrative Adjudication, ADJUDICATION RES., https://acus.law.stanford.edu 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2018) [https://perma.cc/W7SP-B5K2].  
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Part III analyzes the function of hybrid enforcement—that is, 
the combination of elements of both public and private enforcement 
schemes—in agency adjudication. Public enforcement offers greater 
political accountability and more coherent implementation of policy. 
Private enforcement supplements agency expertise with the situated 
knowledge of regulatory beneficiaries and enhances their access to 
legal remedies.24 Diversifying enforcement inputs reduces the risk of 
political or interest group capture of agency enforcement. Although 
not without its own risks, hybrid enforcement can further the goals of 
agency adjudication while mitigating some of the dangers posed by 
transferring cases from generalist courts to specialized policymaking 
bodies. 
Finally, Part IV compares the merits of private enforcement in 
administrative and judicial forums and uses several case studies from 
the current administration to explore how enhancing private rights 
might check political capture.25 In this way, Part IV contributes to 
recent literature seeking to develop standards and tools for 
restraining executive branch enforcement discretion.26 Scholars have 
long grappled with the ability of agencies to use enforcement 
discretion to shield changes in policy from judicial review.27 Private 
 
 24. See Cynthia R. Farina et al., Knowledge in the People: Rethinking “Value” in Public 
Rulemaking Participation, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1185, 1187, 1197 (2012) (describing how 
stakeholders have important “situated knowledge” about the regulatory environments in which 
they live). 
 25. The Trump administration is not unique in exerting control over the regulatory state to 
pursue its policy goals. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 
2246 (2001) (arguing that President Clinton “increasingly made the regulatory activity of the 
executive branch agencies into an extension of his own policy and political agenda”); see also 
Philip Rucker & Robert Costa, Bannon Vows a Daily Fight for “Deconstruction of the 
Administrative State,” WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/top-
wh-strategist-vows-a-daily-fight-for-deconstruction-of-the-administrative-state/2017/02/23/ 
03f6b8da-f9ea-11e6-bf01-d47f8cf9b643_story.html [https://perma.cc/DY4F-ZBR6] (“The reclusive 
mastermind behind President Trump’s nationalist ideology and combative tactics . . . declar[ed] 
that the new administration is in an unending battle for ‘deconstruction of the administrative 
state.’ ”); see also examples discussed infra Section IV.B. 
 26. See, e.g., Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 
1124 (2013) (examining “what more formal and transparent presidential enforcement could look 
like”); Barkow, supra note 12 (suggesting ways to improve agency enforcement oversight); Mila 
Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 105 (2017) (recommending judges “play a role in 
encouraging executive branch actors to make improved” decisions.). 
 27. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 12, at 1169 (“[T]o have real judicial oversight of what 
agencies are doing with their enforcement powers, a new framework of limited judicial review of 
these settlements may be required.”); Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-
Agent Approach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381, 1435 (2011) (proposing “a new framework for judicial review of agency 
delays”); Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission, 59 EMORY L.J. 369 (2009) 
(addressing the chronic problem of nonenforcement decisions). 
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rights of action, paired with a requirement that agencies explain their 
adjudicatory decisions, should make such changes more transparent, 
subject to judicial review, and accountable to the electorate.  
Agency adjudication continues to play an important role in 
delivering access to justice and a more coherent and politically 
accountable public policy. Far from being merely a cheap version of 
federal court or a second-best alternative to rulemaking, agency 
adjudication is essential to the goals of the regulatory state. But to 
legitimately serve these goals, administrative schemes must be 
carefully designed with an understanding of the dynamics of hybrid 
enforcement. Moreover, beyond the question of regulatory design, the 
complexity of administrative enforcement suggests that the Supreme 
Court was correct in Stern and Oil States to abandon a public rights 
doctrine based on the identity of the parties. Regardless of the formal 
parties involved, much administrative enforcement implicates public 
rights and private rights in ways that are difficult to untangle. 
I. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IN FEDERAL COURT 
Private parties play a critical role in the enforcement of U.S. 
regulatory law, filing the vast majority of statutory actions in federal 
court. Scholars argue that “private attorneys general” supplement the 
resources of public enforcers, address regulatory violations that escape 
the notice of public officials, and mitigate the risks of government 
inaction due to regulatory capture, political constraints, or 
bureaucratic ossification. Yet private enforcement may also interfere 
with carefully calibrated public enforcement policies, thus 
undermining their political accountability and resulting in 
overdeterrence and inconsistent regulatory requirements.  
A. The Importance of Private Enforcement in Federal Court 
Private parties play a more important role in enforcing 
regulatory law in the U.S. legal system than in other advanced 
economies.28 Although private actions arising under federal statutes 
 
 28. For accounts of the rise of private enforcement of regulatory regimes during the postwar 
period, see STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE 
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017); FARHANG, supra note 13; John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for 
Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 669 
(1986) (“American law relies upon private litigants to enforce substantive provisions of law that 
in other legal systems are left largely to the discretion of public enforcement agencies.”); and 
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968) (“When the Civil Rights Act of 
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have a long history, scholars noted a significant increase during the 
latter half of the twentieth century. Between 1974 and 1998 alone, 
Congress created 474 new causes of action.29 Indeed, “every major 
environmental law passed since 1970 now includes a citizen suit 
provision (with the anomalous exception of the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act).”30 In addition, for about fifteen years 
following the Supreme Court’s 1964 decision in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 
federal courts liberally construed many federal statutes to recognize 
implied private rights of action.31  
Consider that 179,308 of the 281,202 civil actions filed in 
federal district courts in the twelve-month period ending June 30, 
2018 were statutory claims.32 But the United States was a plaintiff in 
only 3,298 of these cases, or less than two percent.33 Private plaintiffs, 
by contrast, filed more than 80,000 claims under antitrust, banking, 
civil rights, environmental, labor, intellectual property, securities, and 
consumer protection laws.34 During the eight years of the Obama 
administration, suits by the United States never comprised more than 
3.4 percent, and averaged about 2.6 percent, of the statutory actions 
filed in district courts.35 
 
1964 was passed, it was evident that . . . the Nation would have to rely in part upon private 
litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the law.”). 
 29. Judith Resnik, “Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice”: Inventing the Federal District 
Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607, 
649 (2002) (citing ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REVISION OF LIST OF STATUTES 
ENLARGING FEDERAL COURT WORKLOAD (Sept. 18, 1998)) (“New legislative enactments, both civil 
and criminal, ranged from consumer and environmental rights to workers’ protection and civil 
rights.”). 
 30. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 185, 192.  
 31. Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. 
L. REV. 1193, 1196 (1982) (explaining that federal courts increasingly recognized private rights of 
action under regulatory statutes during the 1960s and 1970s). The Court has since retreated 
from its willingness to find implied causes of action, however. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 
534 U.S. 61, 67 n.3 (2001) (“Since our decision in Borak, we have retreated from our previous 
willingness to imply a cause of action where Congress has not provided one.”). 
 32. JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (June 30, 2018), supra note 1. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C-
2 (Dec. 31, 2016), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/stfj_c2_1231.2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6A4K-4EJQ]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C-2 (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_ 
tables/stfj_c2_1231.2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7D3-RT5S]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C-2 (Dec. 31, 2014), https://www.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/c02dec14_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HWS-FVS9]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C-2 (Dec. 31, 2013), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/C02Dec13.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
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Two areas in which private enforcement is particularly robust 
are civil rights and labor policy. In the twelve-month period ending 
June 30, 2018, private plaintiffs filed 40,134 civil actions under civil 
rights statutes and 17,514 civil actions under labor laws, dwarfing the 
237 and 266 civil actions, respectively, filed by the United States.36 
Even in what might be described as “core regulatory areas,” private 
actions in federal courts exceeded the number of public actions 
dramatically: 1,599 to 97 in environmental cases; 10,848 to 6 in 
consumer cases; 605 to 14 in antitrust cases; 1,306 to 229 in cases 
involving securities, commodities, and exchanges; and 644 to 1 in the 
heavily regulated areas of cable and satellite TV.37 
To be sure, the sheer number of private statutory actions 
cannot tell the whole story. Some cases may have little or no 
regulatory impact, while others may have significant repercussions.38 
Public enforcers likely select cases with the most bang for the buck, 
helping large numbers of individuals with fewer actions. But private 
class action attorneys also file cases on behalf of large groups of 
people. Moreover, tort and contract actions, which are not included in 
the count of statutory claims, are regulatory in nature.39 They are not 
created by Congress, of course, but they are part of the regulatory 
background against which Congress legislates. 
 
A3HE-83EF]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 
tbl.C-2 (Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/ 
C02Dec12.pdf [https://perma.cc/LYL7-SXDA]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C-2 (Dec. 31, 2011), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ 
files/statistics_import_dir/C02Dec11.pdf [https://perma.cc/28A7-2HC2]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C-2 (Dec. 31, 2010), 
[https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/C02Dec10.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
55NZ-RTJS]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 
tbl.C-2 (Dec. 31, 2009), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/ 
C02Dec09.pdf [https://perma.cc/ALW7-K8SP].  
 During the first full year of the Trump administration reflected in the Federal Judicial 
Caseload Statistics (twelve-month period ending March 31, 2018), the United States filed 3,294 
(less than two percent) of the 178,549 statutory claims filed. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS tbl.C-2 (Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/file/ 
24436/download [https://perma.cc/L4YT-5JUL]. 
 36. JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (June 30, 2018), supra note 1.  
 37. Id. 
 38. See William B. Rubenstein, On What A “Private Attorney General” Is—and Why It 
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004) (explaining that although most suits by private parties 
under regulatory statutes serve both public and private functions, the mix varies across suits). 
 39. See, e.g., Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner’s Shadow: Toward A Coherent 
Jurisprudence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 391 (1995) (“[T]he common law itself was 
merely a regulatory regime in which the government chose to prefer some interests over 
others . . . .”). 
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Thus, although it is difficult to measure precisely the relative 
importance of public and private parties to regulatory enforcement in 
federal court, it is clear that private parties play a critical, if not 
dominant, role in the U.S. legal system. 
B. The Benefits of Private Enforcement of Public Law 
Scholars have identified a number of advantages to using 
private rights of action in aid of public enforcement. First, “private 
attorneys general” bring significant additional resources to the task of 
enforcing public law.40 Both state and federal agencies are chronically 
underresourced and overworked.41 Private enforcement regimes 
enable policymakers to utilize private resources to subsidize the 
pursuit of public goods.42 They may also provide remedies to 
regulatory beneficiaries who are not sufficiently well organized or 
numerous enough to secure the attention of public enforcers or whose 
injuries are simply not high priorities in light of scarce public 
resources.43 Moreover, the additional resources of private enforcement 
may allow agencies to devote more of their own resources to activities 
that private parties cannot perform, such as rulemaking, 
 
 40. See Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 850–51 (2016) (“Effective 
enforcement of civil-rights laws depends on private litigation . . . .”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing 
the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 
MD. L. REV. 215, 218 (1983) (“The conventional theory of the private attorney general stresses 
that the role of private litigation is not simply to secure compensation for victims, but is at least 
equally to generate deterrence, principally by multiplying the total resources committed to the 
detection and prosecution of the prohibited behavior.”); Stephenson, supra note 12, at 107 
(“[P]rivate enforcement can provide more enforcement resources and facilitate more efficient 
allocation of public resources.”).  
 41. See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private 
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1410 (2000) (describing the 
resource constraints of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing 
After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 221 (1992) (noting 
that Congress frequently gives agencies “difficult or even impossible tasks,” sets unrealistic 
deadlines for actions, and then “appropriates inadequate resources” for the job); Thompson, 
supra note 30, at 191 (“[T]he enforcement wings of both federal and state environmental agencies 
are often woefully understaffed and underfunded.”). 
 42. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (finding an implied private 
right of action in part because the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) does not have time 
to investigate all potential violations of the securities laws).  
 43. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1294 (“[A]dministrative bureaucracies sometimes 
tend to sacrifice the diffused interests of widely scattered beneficiaries in favor of the interests of 
more cohesive and better-organized groups, such as regulated firms and the bureaucrats 
themselves . . . .”). 
Sant’Ambrogio_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/26/2019  2:13 PM 
438 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2:425 
 
investigations, and prosecutions of difficult cases, creating an efficient 
public/private division of labor.44 
Second, private parties supplement the information resources 
of public enforcers and may have better information about certain 
types of regulatory violations.45 It is impossible for public enforcers to 
monitor and detect every potential violation of law.46 Moreover, in 
many cases injured parties have the most detailed and immediate 
information about regulatory violations.47 For example, employees, 
workers, and consumers will likely be the first to know of violations of 
civil rights, workplace health and safety regulations, or consumer 
protection laws.48 In addition, private enforcement may give rise to a 
specialized bar that provides economies of scale, particularly where 
class actions are available, and accomplishes some of the same 
systemic reform sought through public enforcement.49  
Third, private parties can bring enforcement actions when an 
agency otherwise would not because of regulatory capture, political 
constraints, or bureaucratic ossification.50 Thus, private litigation can 
serve as an agency-forcing measure, or “safety valve,” when public 
enforcers and the political branches are either reluctant or unable to 
 
 44. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 40, at 224–25 (“[I]t often may be more efficient for public 
agencies to concentrate on detection (an area where they have the comparative advantage 
because of their superior investigative resources) and leave the actual litigation of the case to 
private enforcers, who are frequently more experienced in litigation tactics.”). 
 45. See Burbank et al., supra note 13, at 663–64; Gilles, supra note 41, at 1429 (“[T]he 
federal government routinely looks to private citizens or entities to aid in the enforcement of 
laws, often on the theory that the most likely initial source of information about wrongdoing is 
the citizenry, whose millions of ‘eyes on the ground’ see far more than federal investigators ever 
could . . . .”). 
 46. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 (1969) (“The Attorney General has 
a limited staff and often might be unable to uncover quickly new regulations and 
enactments . . . .”).  
 47. See Gilles, supra note 41, at 1429 (“[T]he most likely initial source of information about 
wrongdoing is the citizenry . . . .”); cf. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1298 (valuating the 
relative costs of public and private enforcement). But see Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of 
Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 579–80 (1981) (questioning whether private parties are more likely to 
detect certain violations of the securities laws without the incentives of large sanctions, which 
may skew enforcement). 
 48. See also Thompson, supra note 30, at 192 (“Citizen . . . [i]nformants often may be the 
only source of information concerning midnight dumping, equipment tampering, the capture of 
endangered species, and other covert violations.”). 
 49. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1298 (discussing “the relative costs of private 
and public enforcement”). 
 50. See Burbank et al., supra note 13, at 664–65 (noting the tendency of public regulators to 
underenforce due to capture or ideological preferences); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 
1226, 1298 (addressing capture and diseconomies of scale). 
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enforce statutory mandates.51 In this way, private enforcement 
regimes can enhance democratic accountability by promoting “fidelity 
to statutory purpose.”52 Finally, centralized public enforcement is 
prone to “diseconomies of scale,” resulting in bureaucratic ossification 
due to “multiple layers of decision and review and the temptation to 
adopt overly rigid norms in order to reduce administrative costs.”53 
Private plaintiffs avoid these bureaucratic constraints. 
Fourth, private parties can push agencies to interpret their 
mandates in new, socially beneficial ways.54 Even when agencies are 
not captured by a regulated industry, private attorneys may be more 
adventuresome and forward-looking than public enforcers in the types 
of cases they bring and the legal claims they pursue.55 Moreover, 
enforcing and shaping regulatory policy through civil actions may 
constitute a form of participatory government.56 Through private 
litigation, the judiciary provides a channel for individuals and 
nonmajoritarian interests to be heard on important policy choices and 
public commitments.57 
In sum, private enforcement supplements the financial and 
information resources of public enforcers, mitigates the effects of 
capture and other constraints on agency action, and contributes to the 
evolution of the law in socially useful directions. 
 
 51. See Coffee, supra note 40, at 227 (“[P]rivate enforcement also performs an important 
failsafe function by ensuring that legal norms are not wholly dependent on the current attitudes 
of public enforcers . . . .”); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1295 (“Private rights of 
action . . . give power to judges and self-selected private litigants to determine whether 
enforcement is desirable in particular cases.”) 
 52. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1200. 
 53. Id. at 1298. 
 54. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 16 (2001) 
(“Adversarial legalism makes the judiciary and lawyers . . . more fully democratic in character.”); 
Burbank et al., supra note 13, at 664 (“Private enforcement regimes encourage legal 
innovation.”). 
 55. See Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing 
and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1404 (1998) (finding private plaintiffs have generally 
brought the most “cutting edge” cases under antidiscrimination laws). Professor Selmi also notes 
how private plaintiffs first made use of testers to provide evidentiary support for housing 
discrimination claims, a practice later adopted by government agencies. Id. at 1426. 
 56. See Burbank et al., supra note 13, at 666 (explaining that this type of participation is a 
potential advantage of private enforcement and contributes to a broader democratic regime). 
 57. See id.; Maya Sen, Courting Deliberation: An Essay on Deliberative Democracy in the 
American Judicial System, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 303, 312–15 (2013) 
(describing how legal theorists position courts within a deliberative democracy). 
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C. The Risks of Private Enforcement of Public Law 
The core critique of private enforcement is that it shifts control 
over regulatory policy from politically accountable public officials to 
politically unaccountable private litigants and thousands of unelected 
federal judges. In the process, private enforcement may upset 
carefully calibrated public enforcement policies.58  
The political branches exercise significant control over public 
enforcement. The president appoints the key executive branch officials 
overseeing federal enforcement, supervises them, and generally may 
replace those who disappoint him. Although some public enforcers 
have for-cause removal protections, they too seem to align themselves 
more closely with the president’s preferences than with courts and 
private plaintiffs.59 Despite some debate concerning the extent of 
Congress’s control over executive agencies,60 it too possesses powerful 
tools to shape public enforcement. In addition to its legislative 
authority, Congress can initiate investigations, hold oversight 
hearings, and flex its power over the federal budget.61 More generally, 
 
 58. See Engstrom, supra note 12, at 630–41 (exploring arguments that private enforcement 
is “overzealous, uncoordinated, and democratically unaccountable”); Joseph A. Grundfest, 
Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s 
Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 968–71 (1994) (arguing that private litigation is not an 
appropriate enforcement mechanism because private securities class action litigants often have 
divergent incentives from those at the SEC and are not subject to the same congressional 
oversight); Margaret H. Lemos, Privatizing Public Litigation, 104 GEO. L.J. 515, 569–82 (2016) 
(evaluating ways in which privatization both distorts and empowers public litigation); Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., Agency Authority To Define the Scope of Private Rights of Action, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 
7–10 (1996) (suggesting that private litigation has the potential to eliminate the advantages of 
agency-administered statutes by requiring the judiciary to particularize the meaning of terms in 
a broadly worded statute); Stephenson, supra note 12, at 95 (arguing that Congress should 
delegate the power to create private rights of action to the appropriate executive department or 
agency).  
 59. See Terry Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 197, 220–21 (1982) (suggesting that presidential policy changes can affect the conditions in 
which agencies operate, such as the economy, thus affecting how agencies’ behavior correlates 
with different presidential administrations); Ryan C. Black, Adam Candeub & Eric Hunnicutt, 
Political Control of Independent Agency Voting (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
 60. Cf., e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2027, 2150 (2002) (suggesting that independent agencies are “more responsive to 
congressional preferences” than the president’s); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of 
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1696 n.128 (1975) (questioning 
congressional control of agency action); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic 
Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 
91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 767 (1983) (advocating “congressional dominance”). 
 61. See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61 (2006) 
(examining the complex and changing relationship between Congress and the administrative 
state); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1227–28 (suggesting that Congress’s tools for 
supervising the regulatory process might be preferred to relying on judges and private litigants). 
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agency heads charged with implementing statutory mandates are 
embedded within a national policy environment far removed from 
most private plaintiffs and secondary to the work of federal judges.  
Political accountability is valued in enforcement because the 
statutory standards enacted by Congress are often broad and 
overinclusive. Therefore, even absent resource constraints, public 
enforcers are expected to prioritize the most egregious legal violations 
and avoid actions that might be within the letter but not the spirit of 
the law. Such enforcement decisions are ultimately judgments about 
congressional intent (real or imagined) and the “public interest.” 
Consequently, some level of political accountability is essential.62 Even 
when private parties are driven by their good-faith understandings of 
the “public interest,” there is no check from democratic institutions 
over how they define this inherently contested concept. 
Moreover, private parties are likely to choose enforcement 
actions based on short-term financial incentives—i.e., expected 
recovery—rather than their conception of the public interest, policy 
goals, or other public-regarding values.63 If the financial incentives are 
sufficiently alluring, private parties may bring cases that a public 
enforcer would not based on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion or 
a different understanding of the law’s objectives. Thus, private parties 
may take advantage of statutory ambiguities to advance novel claims 
inconsistent with an agency’s own interpretation of the law or its 
policymaking agenda.64 They may also bring cases establishing bad 
precedents that a public enforcer with an eye toward developing the 
law would not.65 Even worse, private plaintiffs may bring “strike 
suits”—nonmeritorious cases brought in the hopes that the defendant 
 
 62. See Burbank et al., supra note 13, at 670 (“Critics of private enforcement litigation 
complain that it can be deeply undemocratic, unsuited to a political community committed to 
representative democracy, electoral accountability, and legislative supremacy.”); Stewart & 
Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1227 (“Electoral representation is the traditional mechanisms for 
pooling collective interests.”).  
 63. See Burbank et al., supra note 13, at 671 (“[P]rivately prosecuted litigation is guided by 
private (often economic) interests that may be in conflict with the public interest.”). But see 
Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853 
(2014) (questioning the traditional view of public and private enforcement objectives). 
 64. Engstrom, supra note 12, at 637–41. 
 65. Frank B. Cross, Rethinking Environmental Citizen Suits, 8 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 
55, 69 (1989) (“[D]ecisions in citizen suits may create adverse precedents for future government 
enforcement. Such a result could compromise all future enforcement, by government and citizens 
alike.”); Engstrom, supra note 12, at 637–41. 
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will settle rather than face the cost and bad publicity of protracted 
litigation.66 
Private enforcement also runs the risk of overdeterrence—i.e., 
enforcement actions in which the costs of enforcement and compliance 
exceed the benefits of the remedy.67 To be sure, this concern is often 
mitigated by the economic costs of litigation. Private parties are 
unlikely to bring suit unless the benefits of enforcement are worth the 
costs to the plaintiffs.68 But class actions can overcome this constraint 
and result in damage awards that “exceed social costs and that do not 
equal wealth forcibly transferred from the plaintiffs to the 
defendants.”69 Such actions may weaken public support for the law 
and regulatory enforcement generally, thereby undermining the goals 
Congress sought to achieve. Moreover, even when a public enforcer 
does bring suit, private parties may merely duplicate the public action 
without adding any independent value.70 Conversely, private 
enforcement alone may result in underdeterrence of certain types of 
regulatory harms if the litigation costs are greater than the expected 
recovery. 
Finally, private enforcement is decentralized in ways that 
impede the implementation of a consistent and coherent regulatory 
policy. Thousands of “private attorneys general” may file suits without 
coordinating their actions. Filings in district courts spread across 
multiple circuits may result in inconsistent opinions in similar cases 
due to the infrequency of Supreme Court review.71 Consequently, 
regulated parties may face different legal requirements in different 
parts of the country.72 Public enforcement also struggles with 
consistency across the federal judiciary. But public enforcers can 
facilitate more uniform enforcement through centralized control over 
decisions to institute enforcement actions. In addition, agencies enjoy 
greater deference from the courts on judicial review than litigants 
 
 66. Burbank et al., supra note 13, at 669; Grundfest, supra note 58, at 970–71; Stephenson, 
supra note 12, at 116. 
 67. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1297. 
 68. Id. at 1290. 
 69. Id. at 1304. 
 70. There is some debate over whether private plaintiffs do in fact mostly “piggy-back” on 
public enforcement actions. See Stephenson, supra note 12, at 128 n.117 (collecting literature on 
the question). 
 71. Burbank et al., supra note 13, at 719; Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1292–93. 
 72. Pierce, supra note 58, at 8–9 (using “[t]he many inconsistent judicial opinions 
purporting to define ‘owner or operator,’ as that term is used in [the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, to] illustrate the problems that are 
potentially created by private rights of action” and noting that “[t]he judicial opinions are 
massively inconsistent and incoherent”). 
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pursuing private actions in federal court.73 Finally, agencies can 
refuse to “acquiesce” in circuit case law in certain circumstances and 
have better recourse to Congress in the face of adverse judicial 
decisions.74 
In sum, critics charge that private enforcement is politically 
unaccountable, potentially wasteful, and risks creating inconsistent 
regulatory policy driven by private parties and judicial preferences. 
Missing from this debate, however, is any consideration of how private 
enforcement operates in agency adjudication.  
II. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IN 
AGENCY ADJUDICATION 
The relationship between public and private enforcement in 
agency adjudication is different than in federal court. While the 
government is involved in only a fraction of cases brought in federal 
court, it is ubiquitous in agency adjudication. Yet most administrative 
schemes are also designed to give private parties important roles in 
enforcement. Indeed, many administrative schemes are best described 
as hybrid forms of public and private enforcement, falling somewhere 
on a continuum between the two.  
A. The Scope and Breadth of Agency Adjudication 
The number of agency actions potentially qualifying as 
adjudication is enormous, even using the definition provided by the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The APA defines 
“adjudication” to mean an “agency process for the formulation of an 
order.”75 An order, in turn, is defined as “the whole or a part of a final 
disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory 
in form, of an agency in a matter other than rulemaking but including 
licensing.”76 As Professor Ed Rubin suggests,  
Every time an agency plans its future actions or evaluates its prior ones, allocates its 
resources, gives advice, makes a promise, issues a threat, negotiates, conducts an 
 
 73. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding 
that courts must give deference to agency statutory interpretation so long as the interpretation is 
reasonable). 
 74. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative 
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989). 
 75. 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (2012). 
 76. 5 U.S.C. § 551(6).  
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investigation, and most of the time it denies an application or makes an exception, it is 
at least arguably engaged in informal adjudication.77  
The APA provides special procedural requirements for so-called 
“formal adjudication” if a separate statute requires the agency to 
decide the matter “on the record after opportunity for an agency 
hearing.”78 Everything else is considered “informal adjudication.” Yet 
Professor Michael Asimow has shown that much of the so-called 
“informal adjudication” is actually quite “formal,” using many of the 
same procedural requirements as adjudication conducted under 
Sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA.79 At the same time, a vast 
swath of informal adjudication might be “more accurately described as 
executive action, or some similar term . . . . Most of the innumerable 
administrative actions that fall within this category are unrelated to 
adjudication, as that term is generally conceived.”80  
Although defining the precise contours of agency adjudication 
is difficult, this Article uses a definition borrowed in part from 
Professor Asimow: an administrative process in which a federal official 
uses an evidentiary hearing to resolve a claim or dispute involving at 
least two parties (one of which may be the government).81 The federal 
decisionmaker may be the head of an agency, an administrative law 
judge (“ALJ”), an administrative judge, or another agency official.82  
 
 77. Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 95, 107–08 (2003). 
 78. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2012); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–57 (2012) (detailing the procedures of 
administrative hearings).  
 79. Professor Asimow has identified eighty-seven agencies that conduct administrative 
adjudications involving an evidentiary hearing. This includes both “formal” adjudication and 
“informal” adjudication, as they are traditionally known, although Asimow’s study problematizes 
this nomenclature. See MICHAEL ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURES ACT 3 (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
adjudication-outside-the-administrative-procedure-act-final-report_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P4U-
ZN73] [hereinafter ASIMOW REPORT] (“[Some so-called informal adjudication] is even more formal 
than the familiar trial-type adjudication procedure prescribed by the APA. In contrast, some 
[formal] adjudication (such as the inquisitorial Security Disability program) is less formal than 
many [informal adjudication] schemes.”); Federal Administrative Adjudication, supra note 23 
(collecting a comprehensive picture of agency adjudicatory schemes, different types of 
adjudication, and empirical data about administrative agencies). Professor Asimow argues that 
“[t]he term ‘informal adjudication’ should be reserved for Type C adjudication which lacks legally 
required evidentiary hearings.” ASIMOW REPORT, supra, at 3.  
 80. Rubin, supra note 77, at 109. 
 81. This comprises what Professor Asimow describes as Type A and Type B adjudications 
and excludes Type C adjudications, which do not involve evidentiary hearings. ASIMOW REPORT, 
supra note 79, at 3–5.  
 82. ALJs conduct adjudicatory hearings under Sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA and 
are entitled to certain job protections and insulation from agency pressure. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 
§ 554(d) (prohibiting ex parte communications and supervision by agency personnel involved in 
investigation and prosecution); 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012) (ALJs may only be removed “for good 
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Defined as such, agencies adjudicate more cases each year than 
the entire federal judiciary. The majority of these cases involve 
disputes between the government and beneficiaries of social welfare 
programs, federal employees, and government contractors.83 Congress 
turned to government agencies to resolve such cases early in the 
Republic’s history, as the needs of a growing nation outstripped the 
ability of congressional committees to handle petitions for pensions by 
invalid Revolutionary War veterans,84 relief from taxes and customs 
duties,85 and claims to public lands.86 Just like today, Congress simply 
did not have time or expertise to adjudicate all claims by citizens for 
relief. Therefore, although Congress continued to use private bills to 
handle some petitions, it increasingly turned to the executive and 
judicial branches to adjudicate the bulk of individual claims upon the 
government for relief.87 Today, the Social Security Administration 
alone houses the largest adjudicatory system in the world, hearing 
roughly twice the number of cases as the entire federal judiciary.88  
 
cause established . . . on the record after opportunity for hearing.”). Administrative Judges (“AJ”) 
are not entitled to the same protections under the APA, but frequently enjoy similar protections 
under their organic statutes or the agencies’ own rules of practice and procedure. The “functional 
independence accorded to AJs varies with the particular agency and type of adjudication . . . .” 
The Federal Administrative Judiciary (ACUS Recommendation No. 92-7), 57 Fed. Reg. 61,760 
(Dec. 29, 1992). But many AJs perceive themselves as similarly insulated from sanctions by 
agency policymakers. See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46 
ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 278–81 (1994) (contrasting ALJ and AJ attitudes about judicial 
independence). Today, there are far more non-ALJ adjudicators than ALJs in the administrative 
state. See KENT BARNETT ET AL., NON-ALJ ADJUDICATORS IN FEDERAL AGENCIES: STATUS, 
SELECTION, OVERSIGHT, AND REMOVAL 8, 17 (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.acus.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/Non-ALJ Draft Report_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SYE-2C4H] (reporting 
10,831 non-ALJs and 1,931 ALJs). This Article refers to ALJs, AJs, and other agency officials 
who preside over agency adjudication, collectively, as administrative judges or adjudicators. 
 83. OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNIK, ADJUDICATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO PROCEDURE 40 (2003). 
 84. THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS 105 (1995). 
 85. MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE 17 (2013). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. at 18 (describing congressional use of commissions as early as 1794 to adjudicate 
claims arising from lost property during the Revolutionary War and distillery duties paid during 
a drought); see also Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792) (describing an administrative 
system for handling Revolutionary War veterans’ pensions). Professor Maggie McKinley suggests 
that “the administrative state [was] an outgrowth of the . . . congressional petitioning [process] 
from the Founding into the twentieth century.” Maggie McKinley, Petitioning and the Making of 
the Administrative State, at *6 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Early petitions 
were typically addressed to Congress rather than the executive because, unlike in Europe, the 
executive was not thought to exercise sovereign powers. See FRANK J. GOODNOW, 2 COMPARATIVE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS, NATIONAL AND LOCAL, OF 
THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, FRANCE AND GERMANY 136 (1897). 
 88. FISS & RESNIK, supra note 17, at 40. 
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Since the nineteenth century, Congress has also turned to 
government agencies to adjudicate regulatory cases—actions brought 
to compel a private party to comply with a legal requirement or 
remedy an injury to another party.89 In these cases, agencies exercise 
the sovereign interest of the government in seeing that the law is 
obeyed and in protecting the “health and well-being” of its citizens.90  
When establishing an administrative forum for regulatory 
cases, Congress often cites the need to provide relief to private parties 
facing obstacles to recovery in federal court. This has been true since 
the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) in 
1887, right up to the creation of inter partes review in the PTAB in 
2011. Congress established the ICC primarily to help those shipping 
goods, in many cases farmers, whom neither the courts nor the states 
would relieve from unreasonable and discriminatory pricing by the 
railroads.91 Congress gave the ICC the power to hear discrimination 
charges against the railroads, order monetary relief, and set 
maximum shipping rates.92 Similarly, Congress turned to agency 
adjudication to assist groups facing difficulty protecting their rights in 
the courts when it enacted the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921,93 
the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act of 1927,94 the 
Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930,95 the National 
 
 89. See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE 
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012) (discussing, inter alia, agency 
adjudication of land disputes and steamboat safety); see also infra notes 91–99 and 
accompanying text. 
 90. Seth Davis, Standing Doctrine’s State Action Problem, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 595, 
601 (2015) (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601, 
607 (1982)) (discussing public rights). 
 91. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 253 (1982) (noting the view of the courts as the 
“archenemy of the forces of populism”). 
 92. Id. at 257. 
 93. J.W. Looney, The Changing Focus of Government Regulation of Agriculture in the 
United States, 44 MERCER L. REV. 763, 775 (1993) (“The reparation procedure is . . . designed to 
give a quicker remedy for the injured party than litigation.”). 
 94. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–50 (2012); Kathleen Krail Charvet et al., Gilding the Lily: The Genesis 
of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act in 1927, the 1972 Amendments, 
the 1984 Amendments, and the Extension Acts, 91 TUL. L. REV. 881, 882 (2017) (“[The Act and its 
amendments] reflect legislation designed to address judicial decisions wherein the Courts have 
been presented with jurisdictional challenges . . . .”). 
 95. Congress enacted the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act “primarily for the 
protection of the producers of perishable agricultural products - most of whom must entrust their 
products to a buyer . . . who may be thousands of miles away, and depend for their payment upon 
his business acumen and fair dealing.” H.R. REP. NO. 1196, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955), 
reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3701; see also Nicole Leonard, The Unsuspecting Fiduciary: The 
Curious Case of PACA and Personal Liability, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 32, 32 (2006) (“[T]he goal of 
Congress has been to protect the more vulnerable players in a vital area of commerce . . . .”). “The 
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Labor Relations Act of 1935,96 the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission Act of 1974,97 the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010,98 and the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act of 2011.99  
Appendix A lists thirty-four federal administrative courts that 
adjudicate regulatory enforcement actions. Appendix A was compiled 
based on a review of the statutory authority and rules of practice and 
procedure of eighty-seven administrative offices listed in the Federal 
Administrative Adjudication Database as having at least one case 
opened or filed in 2013.100 The line between regulatory and benefits 
 
statute was amended in 1984 to create a statutory trust for the benefit of unpaid produce 
suppliers.” Consumers Produce Co. v. Volante Wholesale Produce, Inc., 16 F.3d 1374, 1378 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
 96. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, or Wagner Act, sought to address “inequality 
of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual 
liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership 
association.” National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012)); see also Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. 
Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function 
and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2035–36 (2009) (noting how “[t]he Wagner Act 
declared employers’ militant refusal to recognize unions as the major cause of industrial unrest, 
and the abuse of employer economic power as the major obstacle to improved labor standards”). 
Professors Catherine Fisk and Deborah Malamud note, however, that the Taft-Hartley Act of 
1947 curtailed these gains. Fisk & Malamud, supra, at 2034. 
 97. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389. “Concern over the inefficiency of remedies for 
participants in the commodity markets led to a proposal to create a specialized forum for the 
adjudication of disputes in commodity futures transactions.” Jerry W. Markham, The Seventh 
Amendment and CFTC Reparations Proceedings, 68 IOWA L. REV. 87, 96 (1982) (citing H.R. REP. 
NO. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1974)). A new section was added to the Act “providing for 
administrative reparation proceedings before the Commission by any person against persons 
registered as futures commission merchants, floor brokers, persons associated with futures 
commission merchants or with agents thereof, commodity trading advisors, or commodity pool 
operators.” S. REP. 93-1131, at 96–97 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843, 5868. 
 98. In her essay proposing a consumer financial protection agency, then-Professor Elizabeth 
Warren noted the success with which creditors shielded themselves from legal liability to 
consumers. Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate: If It’s Good Enough for Microwaves, It’s Good 
Enough for Mortgages: Why We Need a Consumer Financial Product Safety Commission, 
DEMOCRACY (Summer 2007), https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate/ 
[https://perma.cc/YD6C-9HTY]. 
 99. The America Invents Act expanded the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) 
authority to review the patentability of claims post patent issuance in order to “establish a more 
efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality and limit unnecessary 
and counterproductive litigation costs” in response to “a growing sense that questionable patents 
are too easily obtained and are too difficult to challenge.” H.R. REP. No. 98–112, pt. 1, at 39–40 
(2011); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its Money: 
Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 237–39 (2015) (discussing 
problems with relying on federal district courts to adjudicate challenges to invalid patents). 
 100. The database is available at https://acus.law.stanford.edu [http://perma.cc/W7SP-B5K2]. 
It includes only caseloads verified by the agencies themselves. Two agencies are notably absent 
from Appendix A because they did not participate in the Survey: the SEC, which adjudicates a 
significant number of enforcement actions each year, see, e.g., Urska Velikonj, Reporting Agency 
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cases is occasionally fuzzy, some agencies adjudicate both kinds of 
cases,101 and reasonable minds may differ over whether to include a 
particular agency.102 Nevertheless, Appendix A offers a broad universe 
of agency adjudication from which we can begin to identify the range 
of public and private rights included in administrative enforcement 
schemes. 
B. Public Enforcement in Agency Adjudication 
When Congress turns to agency adjudication, it usually also 
gives the agency a role in enforcement rather than simply moving 
private enforcement into a non–Article III tribunal. Although the 
government does not track enforcement actions by party in federal 
administrative courts, agency rules of practice and procedure reveal 
the ubiquity of public enforcement in agency design. 
All thirty-four administrative courts listed in Appendix A hear 
cases in which an agency is given enforcement responsibilities.103 
These responsibilities may resemble conventional public enforcement 
duties in which the agency inspects, investigates, and pursues 
enforcement actions directly against regulated entities.104 Twenty-
 
Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 923 tbl.1 
(2016) (noting 610 administrative actions in 2014), and the USPTO, which adjudicates thousands 
of disputes over intellectual property. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PTAB TRIAL 
STATISTICS: IPR, PGR, CBM 3 (Oct. 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
trial_statistics_october_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/C43E-WPME] [hereinafter USPTO, TRIAL 
STATISTICS] (reporting 7,074 inter partes review petitions by private parties in approximately 
five years). Thus, Appendix A likely understates the number of administrative courts that 
adjudicate regulatory enforcement actions.  
 101. I did not include agencies that adjudicate enforcement actions solely aimed at rooting 
out fraud or corruption in a benefits program. See, e.g., Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 
14, at 1676 (discussing Medicaid postpayment audit programs).  
 102. Nevertheless, the literature generally recognizes a distinction between agencies charged 
with the administration of benefits and regulatory agencies. See, e.g., Estreicher & Revesz, supra 
note 74, at 748–49; Daniel J. Gifford, Federal Administrative Law Judges: The Relevance of Past 
Choices to Future Directions, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 52–53 (1997) (recognizing distinction between 
agency adjudication of public benefits and economic regulation); James E. Pfander, Article I 
Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 
659 (2004). 
 103. See infra Appendix A, col. A. The agency may not have enforcement responsibilities in 
every type of case heard by the administrative court, however. In most of these cases, the same 
agency that adjudicates the cases also has enforcement responsibilities, although separation of 
functions rules often limit the communications between the two different parts of the agency. 
 104. The SEC and Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) are good examples. Although the SEC 
maintains an online form for filing “complaints/tips,” it does not “disclose the existence or non-
existence of an investigation and any information gathered unless made a matter of public record 
in proceedings brought before the SEC or in the courts.” SEC Center for Complaints and 
Enforcement Tips, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 4, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/ 
investor-publications/complaintshtml.html [https://perma.cc/WTN4-C7LN]. This is similar to 
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eight of the thirty-four administrative courts in Appendix A hear 
claims in which the government is the only party that may pursue an 
enforcement matter requiring an evidentiary hearing.105 But even 
when the government does not have exclusive enforcement authority, 
it may have responsibility for reviewing, investigating, and 
attempting to settle complaints filed by private parties;106 acting as a 
gatekeeper for private actions;107 or intervening in actions brought by 
private parties to represent the government.108  
These findings are consistent with the perception of 
administrative enforcement as another form of public enforcement. 
Nevertheless, there are two important differences from enforcement in 
federal court. First, Congress not only adds a public enforcer when it 
creates an administrative court, it also nearly always changes the 
identity of the public enforcer. Agencies must rely on the Department 
of Justice (“DOJ”) to bring most enforcement actions in federal court, 
but Congress usually gives public enforcement authority to an agency 
 
how the DOJ acts in civil and criminal cases. “The [FTC] acts only in the public interest and does 
not initiate an investigation or take other action when the alleged violation of law is merely a 
matter of private controversy and does not tend adversely to affect the public.” 16 C.F.R. § 2.3 
(2018). Nevertheless, the FTC also invites private parties to file complaints or otherwise request 
FTC action regarding commercial practices that violate the acts it is charged with administering. 
16 C.F.R. § 2.2 (2018). 
 105. See infra Appendix A, col. B. Note that administrative courts frequently hear more than 
one type of claim and may be structured differently across agencies. For example, an agency may 
have exclusive enforcement authority for most claims, but private parties may be able to pursue 
others on their own.  
 106. For example, the Department of Energy’s Office of Hearings and Appeals investigates 
and reports on certain whistleblower complaints, 10 C.F.R. §§ 708.1, 708.2 (2018); the Assistant 
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development conducts investigations of and seeks to conciliate 
complaints filed under the Fair Housing Act, 24 C.F.R. §§ 103.215, 103.300 (2018); the Secretary 
of Labor investigates complaints of discrimination under the Federal Mine Safety and Health 
Act, 29 C.F.R. § 2700.40 (2018); the Surface Transportation Board may institute investigations 
on its on motion although it mostly hears private complaints; and the United States 
International Trade Commission investigates complaints under the Tariff Act, 19 C.F.R. § 210.9 
(2018). 
 107. The Secretary of Labor, for example, is directed to file a complaint under the Federal 
Mine Safety and Health Act if she determines after investigating a complaint that a violation 
has occurred. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.40. The complainant “may present additional evidence on his own 
behalf” during any subsequent evidentiary hearing. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.4 (2018). Similarly, the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development issues a charge under the Fair Housing Act 
when it determines that reasonable cause exists to believe a violation has occurred. 24 C.F.R. 
§§ 103.15, 103.400 (2018). “An aggrieved person is not a party but may file a motion to 
intervene.” 24 C.F.R. § 180.310 (2018). 
108. The Secretary of Labor, for example, is directed to file a complaint under the Federal 
Mine Safety and Health Act if she determines after investigating a complaint that a violation 
has occurred. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.40. The complainant “may present additional evidence on his own 
behalf” during any subsequent evidentiary hearing. 29 C.F.R. § 2700. 
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other than the DOJ in administrative proceedings.109 The separation 
of powers issues raised by combining enforcement, adjudication, and 
rulemaking in agencies has been well tilled.110  
Second, and less well understood, private parties play a more 
important role in administrative enforcement than public enforcement 
in federal court. As the next Section explains, private parties are 
nearly as ubiquitous as the government in administrative 
enforcement. 
C. The Role of Private Parties in Administrative Enforcement 
Private parties play an underappreciated role in administrative 
enforcement.111 To begin, parties can initiate enforcement actions in 
many administrative schemes by filing a complaint. Twenty-five of the 
administrative courts listed in Appendix A hear cases in which private 
parties have a right to file complaints concerning certain regulatory 
violations.112 Like complaints filed in federal court, these 
administrative complaints trigger a process that may ultimately lead 
to an evidentiary hearing in which the agency adjudicates the claims 
in the complaint. Unlike federal court, however, where the road to 
trial follows a well-trodden path laid out in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure,113 the road to an evidentiary hearing in administrative 
enforcement may take several different paths.  
Twenty-two administrative courts hear claims arising from 
private complaints after some kind of investigation required by the 
 
4 (2018). Similarly, the Department of Housing and Urban Development issues a charge under 
the Fair Housing Act when it determines that reasonable cause exists to believe a violation has 
occurred. 24 C.F.R. §§ 103.15, 103.400 (2018). “An aggrieved person is not a party but may file a 
motion to intervene.” 24 C.F.R. § 180.310 (2018). 
d in court).”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the 
conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or an officer thereof is a party, or is 
interested, and securing evidence therefore, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, 
under the direction of the Attorney General.”). Professors Herz and Devins suggest that agencies 
with access to administrative forums and without independent litigating authority in federal 
court will tilt their enforcement programs to the administrative tribunal in order to avoid relying 
upon the DOJ. Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation on 
Agencies’ Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345, 1369–71 (2000). This raises interesting questions 
about how the DOJ—a generalist enforcer—might impact an agency’s enforcement scheme. See 
Max Minzner, Should Agencies Enforce?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2113, 2115–16 (2015) (challenging the 
claim that specialization is always superior to general enforcement expertise). 
 110. See supra notes 13 & 109. 
 111. See supra notes 14–21 and accompanying text. 
 112. See infra Appendix A, col. C. 
 113. Although, most cases brought in federal court now settle somewhere along the way. 
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agency’s regulations.114 Others conduct investigations without any 
regulatory requirement. These investigations serve different functions 
depending on the type of claim. In some cases, the agency acts as a 
gatekeeper, deciding whether the private party is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing, with or without the agency’s participation.115 In 
others, the agency uses the investigation to decide whether the agency 
should file a formal complaint and pursue an enforcement action.116 It 
may be in the agency’s discretion whether to pursue the complaint, 
even if it finds a regulatory violation,117 or the agency may be required 
to pursue an enforcement action if it finds reason to believe the 
complaint has merit.118  
Moreover, twenty-five administrative courts hear claims in 
which regulatory beneficiaries or other private parties besides the 
respondents may participate in the enforcement action.119 Although 
the specific procedural rights of parties vary by administrative 
scheme, they may include the ability to submit briefs and evidence, 
call and examine witnesses, participate in oral arguments, appeal 
administrative decisions to a higher authority in the agency, and 
 
 114. See infra Appendix A, col. D; see also examples cited supra note 106. 
 115. For example, the Department of Energy may dismiss whistleblower complaints for lack 
of jurisdiction or other good cause as defined in the regulations. 10 C.F.R. § 708.17 (2018). 
Otherwise, if the agency is unable to resolve the matter informally, the complainant may request 
an evidentiary hearing conducted by the Office of Hearings and Appeals. 10 C.F.R. § 708.21 
(2018); see also examples cited supra note 107.  
 116. This is a common design. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. §§ 103.15, 103.400 (2018) (prescribing that 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development should issue a charge under the Fair 
Housing Act when it determines that reasonable cause exists to believe a violation has occurred); 
29 C.F.R. § 102.15 (2018) (“After a charge has been filed, if it appears to the [National Labor 
Relations Board (“NLRB”)] Regional Director that formal proceedings may be instituted, the 
Director will issue and serve on all parties a formal complaint in the Board’s name . . . .”); 29 
C.F.R. § 2700.40 (2018) (prescribing that the Secretary of Labor shall file a complaint under the 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act if she determines after investigating a complaint that a 
violation has occurred). 
 117. See, e.g., FED. ELECTION COMM’N, GUIDEBOOK FOR COMPLAINANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
ON THE FEC ENFORCEMENT PROCESS 12 (May 2012), https://transition.fec.gov/em/respondent_ 
guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZ54-UB8P]: 
Pursuant to an exercise of its prosecutorial discretion, the Commission may dismiss a 
matter when, in the opinion of at least four Commissioners, the matter does not merit 
further use of Commission resources. The Commission may take into account factors 
such as the small dollar amount at issue, the insignificance of the alleged violation, 
the vagueness or weakness of the evidence, or the merits of the response. 
 118. See, e.g., Investigate Charges, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/what-
we-do/investigate-charges (last visited Sept. 30, 2018) [https://perma.cc/XS32-ZYMF] (describing 
how the NLRB pursues meritorious complaints when it is unable to facilitate a settlement 
between the parties). 
 119. See infra Appendix A, col. E; see also, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 2200.20 (2018) (granting 
employees, their representatives, and employers party status in disputes over abatement periods 
set by Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) for employers). 
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ultimately seek judicial review.120 Finally, fifteen administrative 
courts hear claims in which private parties may pursue enforcement 
actions with or without the agency’s participation.121 Such cases most 
closely resemble private enforcement in federal court. 
Thus, administrative enforcement is often hybrid in nature, 
falling somewhere on a continuum between public and private 
enforcement. At either end are administrative schemes virtually 
indistinguishable from public or private enforcement in federal court. 
But much agency adjudication falls somewhere in between, with 
attributes of both. At the public end, an agency may have sole 
discretion whether to pursue an enforcement action or even respond to 
a public complaint.122 At the private end, private parties may have the 
authority to pursue enforcement actions with or without the agency.123 
Between these ends, the agency may generally retain control over 
whether to institute enforcement actions but be required to institute 
such actions when it finds reason to believe a violation has occurred.124 
Alternatively, private parties may be permitted to intervene in agency 
enforcement actions to protect their interests.125 Table 1 lists some 
attributes of public and private enforcement found in the 
administrative schemes included in Appendix A.  
 
 120. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 702 (2012). 
 121. See infra Appendix A, col. F. For example, the Department of Labor’s Benefits Review 
Board hears claims by miners arising from black lung disease, but the Secretary of Labor may 
participate in the cases. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 725.360 (2018). It is common for administrative 
schemes to allow private parties to pursue whistleblower complaints even when the agency 
otherwise has primary enforcement responsibility. 
 122. See, e.g., infra Appendix A (FTC). 
 123. See, e.g., infra Appendix A (DOL Benefits Review Board). 
 124. See, e.g., infra Appendix A (NLRB). 
 125. See, e.g., infra Appendix A (OSHRC). 
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TABLE 1: ENFORCEMENT ATTRIBUTES 
Attributes of Public 
Enforcement 
Attributes of Private 
Enforcement 
Agency reviews private complaints Procedures for private complaints 
Agency investigates complaints Right to investigation 
Agency attempts to settle  Right to decision on complaint 
Agency acts as gatekeeper to private action Right to evidentiary hearing  
Agency may join private actions Right to appeal agency decision  
Agency has nonexclusive right of action Agency action on complaint 
nondiscretionary 
Agency has exclusive public right of action Private parties may join public actions 
Public enforcement is discretionary Nonexclusive private right of action 
 Exclusive private right of action 
 
Table 2 illustrates where some administrative schemes fall on 
the public-private enforcement continuum based on their design.  
TABLE 2: CONTINUUM OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT126 
 
Public 
↑ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
↓ 
Private 
Agency Public Enforcement Private Enforcement 
SEC Exclusive, independent, and 
discretionary public 
enforcement 
 
FTC Exclusive and discretionary 
public enforcement 
Procedures for private 
complaints;  
certain parties may 
intervene in certain cases 
NLRB Agency investigates and 
attempts to settle private 
complaints;  
exclusive public right of action 
Agency action on 
meritorious complaint is 
nondiscretionary; 
complaints may be 
withdrawn; 
certain parties may 
participate in public 
enforcement 
STB Nonexclusive public right of 
action (rarely used) 
Nonexclusive private right 
of action (largely private 
enforcement) 
DOL, 
BRB 
Agency may intervene Exclusive private right of 
action (largely private 
enforcement) 
 
126. For a full list of agencies and their rules of practice and procedure, see infra  
Appendix A. 
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To be sure, some attributes of private enforcement listed in 
Table 1 may seem too trivial, without more, to justify characterizing 
the administrative scheme as anything other than public enforcement. 
The right to file a complaint with an agency is not all that different 
from the ability of a citizen to report a violation of law to a public 
prosecutor. The ability to trigger an agency investigation provides 
citizens with more leverage, but not much. Unless private parties have 
the right to a reasoned decision on their complaint by an independent 
adjudicator based on the record of an evidentiary hearing, they are 
highly dependent on public enforcers for remedies. Courts generally 
grant agencies substantial discretion whether to investigate a charge 
or file a complaint based on that charge.127 
Nevertheless, even very limited procedural rights for private 
parties assist agencies in their pursuit of public goals consistent with 
theories of private enforcement. As discussed more fully in Part III, an 
institutionalized process for reviewing complaints, particularly if it 
triggers an investigation and a written decision by the agency, 
augments the capacity of public enforcers to monitor the regulatory 
landscape and highlights violations that may have escaped their 
attention. Although such rights, without more, may not ultimately 
provide a remedy if the agency is adamantly opposed to enforcement, 
agencies do not always seek to underenforce. When agencies are 
committed to their missions, information from private parties is vital 
to the agency’s enforcement arm.128  
The right to file a complaint or pursue an action does not 
necessarily mean parties use it, of course. Our understanding of 
administrative enforcement would certainly benefit from better 
tracking of cases by party. Nevertheless, the availability of remedies 
creates incentives for private parties to pursue them. In addition, the 
available data confirms that both agencies and private parties do use 
these procedural rights.129 Thus, private parties are deeply embedded 
in agency adjudication.  
 
 127. See Barkow, supra note 12, at 1132 (“Courts tend to steer clear of second-guessing an 
agency’s selection of which actors to target and which to ignore. The judiciary takes a similarly 
hands-off approach to reviewing an agency’s broader plans for how it will proceed with 
enforcement.”); Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 901 (2009) 
(“[A]n agency has a great deal of discretion about which violators it will pursue.”). 
 128. See infra notes 176–177 and accompanying text. 
 129. See, e.g., Velikonj, supra note 100, at 923, tbl.1 (reporting 610 public enforcement 
actions in 2014); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER RESPONSE: COMPLAINTS BY THE 
NUMBERS (2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201503_cfpb_ 
complaints-by-the-numbers.pdf [https://perma.cc/37W5-8B5M] [hereinafter CONSUMER 
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III. THE FUNCTION OF HYBRID ENFORCEMENT IN AGENCY 
ADJUDICATION 
The literature comparing public and private enforcement has 
largely ignored administrative enforcement.130 Thus, there has been 
no attempt to theorize the function of hybrid enforcement in 
administrative courts. This Part begins to fill this gap by examining 
how different attributes of public and private enforcement further the 
goals of agency adjudication while mitigating some of its risks.131  
As discussed more fully in the following Sections, agency 
adjudication seeks to achieve three main goals: greater legal access to 
remedies for private parties;132 more accurate, expeditious, and 
consistent decisions informed by specialized expertise;133 and 
increased coherence and political accountability in public policy.134 Yet 
the pursuit of these goals raises new concerns. Expanding legal access 
for regulatory beneficiaries through informal and less costly 
procedures puts pressure on the accuracy and legitimacy of agency 
decisions.135 Increasing the specialization and expertise of adjudicators 
increases the danger of narrow-minded decisions, agency capture, and 
backlogs caused by caseload volatility.136 The coordination of 
adjudication, enforcement, and rulemaking by a political appointee 
may compromise the rights of parties to individualized decisions and 
result in over- or underdeterrence, with political swings from 
 
RESPONSE] (reporting more than 558,800 consumer complaints filed with the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) during its first three and a half years); U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRIAL STATISTICS, supra note 100 (reporting 7,074 private actions in 
approximately five years); Board Decisions Issued, NAT’L LAB. REL. BD., 
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphs-data/decisions/board-decisions-issued  (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2018) [https://perma.cc/T82R-6MVQ] (reporting several hundred cases decided each 
year triggered by private complaints).  
 130. See supra notes 14–21 and accompanying text. 
 131. Part III examines the goals that have been offered as justification for the use of agencies 
rather than courts to adjudicate certain disputes. There may also be other, less normatively 
attractive reasons why Congress delegates decisions to agencies. See, e.g., Jed Handelsman 
Shugerman, The Dependent Origins of Independent Agencies: The Interstate Commerce 
Commission, the Tenure of Office Act, and the Rise of Modern Campaign Finance, 31 J.L. & POL. 
139, 144 (2015) (arguing that the desire to obtain campaign contributions from industry 
participants contributed to the political support for the creation of the ICC “rather than reliance 
on the courts for enforcement”). 
 132. See infra Section III.A. 
 133. See infra Section III.B. 
 134. See infra Section III.C. 
 135. See infra Section III.A. 
 136. See infra Section III.B. 
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administration to administration.137 Hybrid enforcement can further 
the goals of adjudication while mitigating some of its risks.  
A. Enhancing Access to Justice 
Agency adjudication seeks to enhance access to justice by 
providing a more informal and less expensive forum than federal court 
for the adjudication of disputes that impact private parties.138 When 
Congress creates administrative courts for private parties, it almost 
always cites challenges faced by regulatory beneficiaries in federal 
court.139 Furthering legal access is consistent with one of the 
normative goals of the administrative process generally—greater 
public participation in government policymaking.140  
Expanding legal access through more informal and less costly 
procedures, however, puts pressure on the accuracy and legitimacy of 
agency decisions. This raises due process concerns when there is a 
private party on the other side of the “v.” Hybrid enforcement in 
administrative courts helps address these concerns and allows 
agencies to protect the due process interests of private respondents 
while enhancing access to legal remedies for regulatory beneficiaries. 
1. A More Informal and Less Expensive Forum 
Agencies offer a more informal and potentially more 
expeditious forum for the resolution of claims than federal court. The 
 
 137. See infra Section III.C. 
 138. Legal access is particularly important to the adjudication of government benefits, which 
is often designed to be particularly protective of potential beneficiaries. See, e.g., Veterans’ 
Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. 100-687, § 3007, 102 Stat. 4105, 4107 (1988) (instructing the 
Veterans’ Administration (now the Department of Veterans Affairs) to give claimants “the 
benefit of the doubt” when “there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence 
regarding the merits of an issue”); Frank S. Bloch et al., Developing a Full and Fair Evidentiary 
Record in a Nonadversary Setting: Two Proposals for Improving Social Security Disability 
Adjudications, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 6 n.17 (2003) (noting resistance to providing the 
government with a legal representative or closing the evidentiary record in social security 
disability proceedings). But informal procedures are also helpful to private parties that seek to 
pursue enforcement claims in administrative courts. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986) (noting Congress’s goal in creating the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission to provide “an inexpensive and expeditious alternative forum” to 
federal court); SKOWRONEK, supra note 91, at 146 (reporting that congressional advocates of a 
strong ICC claimed “it would be able to arbitrate disputes quickly and at low cost”). 
 139. See supra Section II.A. 
 140. See, e.g., STEVE P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF 
GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT (2008) (arguing that regulatory agencies are more accessible to 
less powerful groups than legislatures); Stewart, supra note 60, at 1748–55 (describing the 
expansion of participation rights pushed by the courts). 
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APA imposes few procedural requirements on adjudication not subject 
to the requirements of Section 554.141 But even formal adjudication 
under the APA does not include the full panoply of evidentiary tools 
regularly used in federal court. Prehearing discovery is usually quite 
limited, the Federal Rules of Evidence and Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure are rarely controlling (albeit often invoked), and the use of 
juries is unknown.142 Many agency procedures impose strict timelines, 
limit discovery, and provide for paper rather than in-person 
hearings.143  
Due process limits the informality of adjudication when it 
might deprive individuals of property or liberty interests.144 
Nevertheless, although the process due varies given the issues and 
interests at stake, no court has held that due process requires agency 
adjudication to include all the procedures of a civil action in federal 
court.145 Absent due process constraints, agencies typically enjoy broad 
discretion to tailor their procedures to the particular cases they 
hear.146 The Supreme Court has reasoned that agencies “should be 
free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of 
inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous 
duties.”147  
 
 141. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. The LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 655 (1990) (“[T]he minimal 
requirements for [informal adjudication] are set forth in the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 555.”); Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Jr., Taming the Tail that Wags the Dog: Ex Post and Ex Ante Constraints on 
Informal Adjudication, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1057, 1059–60 (2004) (“[T]he APA does not provide 
any specific and dedicated procedural requirements applicable to informal adjudications, and 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (Vermont 
Yankee) effectively precludes reviewing courts from imposing procedures on federal 
administrative agencies.”).  
 142. Even formal adjudications conducted by the SEC with significant sums at stake are not 
bound by the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
 143. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 99, 242–43 (describing procedures for challenging patents 
in the USPTO). 
 144. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46–47 (1975) (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 
579 (1973)) (holding that due process “applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate as 
well as to courts”). 
 145. Krotoszynski, supra note 141, at 1061–62 (“Procedural due process requires, at a 
minimum, notice, a hearing with some sort of opportunity to be heard, and the communication of 
a decision.”); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–35 (1976) (establishing how courts 
should determine how much process is due before the government deprives an individual of 
property or liberty); Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279 
(1975) (reasoning that “if an agency chooses to go further than is constitutionally demanded with 
respect to one [element of a fair hearing], this may afford good reason for diminishing or even 
eliminating another”). 
 146. Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 1653. 
 147. FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940); see also Adoption of 
Recommendations, 81 Fed. Reg. 40,259, 40,260 (June 21, 2016) (“Federal agencies often enjoy 
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Given their relative informality, administrative proceedings 
are generally less costly and more expeditious forums for relief than 
federal court.148 To be sure, some agency adjudication looks 
remarkably similar to its judicial counterpart.149 Nevertheless, when 
direct comparisons can be made, agency proceedings tend to be shorter 
and more streamlined than civil litigation.150 Congress can also reduce 
the costs of enforcement actions by imposing caps on attorney’s fees or 
prohibiting legal representation for either the private party or the 
government.151  
2. Threats of Informality to Accuracy and Legitimacy 
Streamlining agency procedures may impede the ability of 
parties to present their cases, increase the risk of errors by 
decisionmakers, and undermine the legitimacy of agency 
 
broad discretion . . . to craft procedures they deem ‘necessary and appropriate’ to adjudicate the 
cases and claims that come before them.”). 
 148. Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure and the Decline of the 
Trial, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 504 (2003). 
 149. See, e.g., Joseph P. Sirbak II, Procedures for Litigating SOX Whistleblower Complaints, 
2016 WL 3476536, at *4 (2016) (describing the discovery tools in whistleblower disputes, which 
permit “discovery . . . regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to a party’s claim or 
defense”). To be sure, significant delays in agency adjudication, particularly in large benefits 
programs, are notorious and persistent. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 27, at 1381 (“Agency 
delays in decisionmaking and action have been widely acknowledged as a fundamental 
impediment to the effective functioning of federal agencies . . . .”); Michael Sant’Ambrogio & 
Adam Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1994–97 (2012) 
(suggesting that parties be “able to aggregate their claims before” agencies to make adjudication 
more efficient). But these delays are usually due to the time spent waiting for adjudication, 
rather than the time it takes to adjudicate the claims. Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 
644 F.3d 845, 877–78 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing delays in veterans programs); Erik Eckholm, 
Disability Claims Last Longer as Backload Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2007, at A1 (citing five-
hundred-day waiting periods for social security disability claims). 
 150. When comparing administrative and judicial resolution of the same kind of enforcement 
action, SEC Director of Enforcement Andrew Ceresney noted:  
[A]dministrative actions produce prompt decisions. An ALJ normally has 300 days 
from when a matter is instituted to issue an initial decision. That deadline can be 
extended in certain cases, but the hearings are still held promptly. For cases we file in 
district court, we can often go 300 days and still be just at the motion to dismiss stage 
or part of the way through discovery, with any trial still far down the road. 
Andrew Ceresney, Dir., SEC Div. of Enf’t, Remarks to the Am. Bar Ass’n’s Bus. Law Section Fall 
Meeting (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543515297 
[https://perma.cc/CRL5-7XCE]. 
 151. Nora Freeman Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts: Lessons from the 
VICP, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1716 (2015) (noting the National Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program’s (“NVICP”) limits on payments to counsel resulting in fourteen percent of benefits 
being paid to counsel as compared to fifty percent in the tort liability system).  
Sant’Ambrogio_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/26/2019  2:13 PM 
2019] PRIVATE ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT  459 
 
proceedings.152 For example, the Vaccine Court was originally 
envisioned as being informal enough for injured parties to file their 
own claims for vaccine-related injuries without the assistance of 
counsel, but it quickly became apparent that representation by 
experienced counsel was necessary for claimants to succeed.153  
More often, however, complaints come from respondents on the 
other side of the “v.” While agency adjudication of government benefits 
is often structured to be especially solicitous of beneficiaries asserting 
claims against the government,154 regulatory enforcement cases 
involve nongovernmental respondents. Thus, the agency must grapple 
not only with legal access for statutory beneficiaries but also with 
concerns over accuracy and legitimacy on the part of private 
respondents. Whereas due process is irrelevant to the procedural 
protections afforded to government respondents in benefits cases, it 
requires protections for private respondents in enforcement cases. 
Put differently, we do not generally worry about providing 
public enforcers with greater access to an adjudicatory forum. 
Congress can provide them with the necessary resources to bring 
enforcement actions in federal court. Thus, advocates (and critics) of 
agency adjudication speak not in terms of informality and 
expeditiousness of administrative enforcement but in terms of its 
efficiency—i.e., the efficiency of prosecuting enforcement actions in an 
agency rather than a court.155 This justification is generally not 
 
 152. See, e.g., Bloch, supra note 138, at 55 (noting problems in the development of the record 
in social security disability proceedings due to their informality); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers 
for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67, 107 (1995) (“To be accepted as courts, tribunals—
whether specialized or generalist—must look and act like courts.”). 
 153. Engstrom, supra note 151, at 1713 (quoting Representative Patsy Mink). 
 154. For example, the government is not represented as a party in disputes over social 
security disability benefits. See FRANK BLOCH, JEFFREY LUBBERS & PAUL VERKUIL, INTRODUCING 
NONADVERSARIAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES TO IMPROVE THE RECORD FOR DECISION IN 
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY ADJUDICATIONS 3 (2003), https://www.ssab.gov/Portals/0/our_work/ 
reports to the board/RTB-Bloch-Lubbers-Verkuil_Nonadversarial_Representatives_2003.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6NE6-JQQK] (“[Social Security Administration (“SSA”)] hearings are one of the 
few such proceedings where the agency is, as a rule, unrepresented and where the record is left 
open throughout the administrative appeals process to ensure the claimant’s file is complete.”); 
see also Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 321–22 (1985) (discussing 
Congress’s decision to avoid the use of lawyers in the adjudication of veterans benefits out of a 
desire to create a low-cost forum for veterans).  
 155. See, e.g., Jason D. Nichols, Towards Reviving the Efficacy of Administrative Compliance 
Orders: Balancing Due Process Concerns and the Need for Enforcement Flexibility in 
Environmental Law, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 193, 222–23 (2005) (noting how “pre-enforcement 
adjudication within the agency furthers efficiency interests and avoids civil litigation costs”); 
Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 294 
(1978) (noting that fairness and satisfaction for respondents may be more important than 
efficiency when an agency imposes sanctions). 
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considered as compelling as helping private parties advance claims 
that would be difficult to pursue in federal court. Moreover, less 
formal and expedited proceedings have limited upside for respondents 
in enforcement actions, particularly if the stakes are high and the 
respondents are well resourced.156 They would generally prefer the full 
panoply of procedural protections available in federal court. Not 
surprisingly, then, the efficiency rationale is the bête noire of critics of 
agency adjudication of public enforcement actions.157  
Agencies have struggled over process protections for 
respondents in public enforcement actions for many years. For 
example, beginning in the 1960s, the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) began adopting many of the procedures of federal litigation in 
its own proceedings in response to the concerns expressed by 
respondents over the legitimacy of the proceedings.158 More recently, 
respondents in Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
enforcement actions have complained about the compressed timeline 
and limited discovery available in cases heard by SEC ALJs. The SEC 
has responded to these complaints by slowing down the pace of the 
proceedings and affording respondents more discovery tools borrowed 
from federal court.159 These experiences suggest that administrative 
enforcement schemes are unlikely to eliminate adversarialism.160  
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, enhancing legal access 
in agency proceedings requires a careful balancing of the desire for an 
informal and expeditious forum and the need for fair and accurate 
decisionmaking.161  
 
 156. There may be benefits to injured persons not party to the proceedings, however. 
 157. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 3, at 274–75 (criticizing the necessity and efficiency 
justifications). 
 158. D. Bruce Hoffman & M. Sean Royall, Administrative Litigation at the FTC: Past, 
Present, and Future, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 319, 321 (2003). 
 159. Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, 50 Fed. Reg. 60,091 (Oct. 24, 2015). 
In addition to relaxing certain deadlines, the SEC proposed permitting depositions and 
subpoenas under certain conditions. 
 160. THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER 
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 39 (2002) (noting creeping adversarialism in workers’ 
compensation systems); Elinor P. Schroeder, Legislative and Judicial Responses to the 
Inadequacy of Compensation for Occupational Diseases, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1986, 
at 151, 157–58 (noting that adjudication of workers’ compensation claims for occupational 
diseases has “taken on many of the trappings of common law litigation—retention of lawyers, 
delays, cost, and compromise”—unlike most accident claims). 
 161. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for 
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”); Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due 
Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1309 (2012) (arguing that “adapting the demands of due process 
to new facts and circumstances is faithful to constitutional doctrine and necessary to ensure that 
existing procedures continue to provide due process of law”). 
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3. Using Hybrid Enforcement to Enhance Legal Access While 
Protecting Legitimacy 
Hybrid enforcement in agency adjudication addresses the 
tension between enhancing legal access and maintaining the 
legitimacy of adjudicatory decisions. Procedural rights to file 
complaints with an agency, often without the same formalities 
required of pleadings in federal court, improve the ability of private 
parties to bring regulatory violations to the agency’s attention. Agency 
review, investigation of complaints, and assistance in pursuing 
enforcement actions further enhance access to regulatory benefits. Of 
course, a private right to a decision on a complaint based on the record 
of an evidentiary hearing may provide the surest access to relief. But 
this is only true if the party has the resources to pursue such a 
complaint on its own. If not, giving a public enforcer responsibility for 
pursuing private complaints offers beneficiaries a valuable “assist” in 
enforcing their claims.  
At the same time, placing primary responsibility for 
enforcement on public officials allows administrative courts to provide 
process protections for respondents without impeding access to justice 
by beneficiaries. Congress can provide agencies with the resources 
they need to prosecute cases in administrative courts that use 
judicialized procedures to ensure the legitimacy of their decisions. The 
agency can still give beneficiaries a voice in regulatory enforcement by 
pursuing their complaints and allowing private parties to intervene or 
otherwise participate in public actions. But the beneficiaries 
themselves do not need to navigate judicialized procedures designed to 
protect respondents.  
Thus, public enforcement allows agencies to maintain due 
process protections for private respondents while facilitating access for 
private beneficiaries. In this way, hybrid enforcement enhances the 
legitimacy of agency adjudication. 
B. Decisionmaking Informed by Specialized Expertise  
One of the most commonly cited reasons for delegating 
decisions to agencies rather than courts is the need for specialized 
expertise.162 Hybrid enforcement furthers this goal by encouraging 
 
 162. See David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 
89 GEO. L.J. 97, 135 (2000) (“[A] commonly cited and crucial reason for the delegation to agencies 
is the desire to have decisions made by public officials with expertise and extensive information-
gathering capabilities.”). 
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private parties to supplement the information resources of federal 
agencies. At the same time, the use of specialized decisionmakers 
creates new risks: agency “decision mills,” caseload volatility causing 
backlogs, and “agency capture” by regulated industries. Hybrid 
enforcement mitigates the risks of decision mills and agency capture 
by diversifying enforcement inputs, while public control over 
enforcement reduces caseload volatility by filtering cases docketed for 
hearings.  
1. Deploying Agency Expertise in Adjudication 
Agencies are generally able to hire personnel with specialized 
expertise.163 Advocates of agency expertise claim that specialization 
enables decisionmakers to make decisions more quickly because they 
need less time to familiarize themselves with complex issues or 
obscure areas of regulation.164 In addition, specialization enables more 
accurate decisionmaking because the adjudicator is better able to 
assess technical evidence and the relative merits of similar, yet 
distinct claims.165 
Despite the intuitive appeal of these claims, there is scant 
quantitative empirical evidence available to either prove or disprove 
them.166 The significant delays experienced in several adjudicatory 
programs167 and persistent inconsistencies in agency decisions168 
 
 163. Although the ability of agencies to deploy their expertise is somewhat different in 
adjudication than rulemaking, the need for expert decisionmakers remains an important 
justification of agency adjudication. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012) (“[P]atent judges shall be 
persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability . . . .”). 
 164. See LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 3233 (2011) (discussing perceived 
efficiency advantages); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Courts: Specialists 
Versus Generalists, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 788, 794 (2013): 
The ability early on to spot a gap in either a party’s economic reasoning or its factual 
allegations is surely improved by frequent exposure to recurring economic issues. The 
learning curve may be fairly steep, even for antitrust cases, but the generalist judge 
who sees one antitrust case every year or two would surely be slower to progress down 
that curve than would the judge who sees such cases weekly. 
 165. See Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 164, at 797–98. 
 166. See Engstrom, supra note 151, at 1640. 
 167. See, e.g., Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 1675–76. 
 168. See, e.g., JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM 
ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 6 (2009) (citing wide disparities in the outcomes of 
similar asylum applications); Engstrom, supra note 151, at 1677 (citing DIVISION OF VACCINE 
INJURY COMPENSATION, NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM STRATEGIC PLAN, 
app. H at 25 (2006)) (noting inconsistencies in the Vaccine Court decisions); James D. Ridgway, 
Barton F. Stichman & Rory E. Riley, “Not Reasonably Debatable”: The Problems with Single-
Judge Decisions by the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 3 (2016) 
(surveying inconsistencies in decisions by the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims). But see 
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suggest a healthy dose of skepticism, particularly in agencies with 
large caseloads. Moreover, the value of expertise and specialization 
will vary with the complexity of the evidence relevant to the claims 
heard by administrative courts. When the issues are not particularly 
difficult, specialization may not add much in the way of more accurate 
decisionmaking.169 By contrast, when cases involve technical issues, 
specialized knowledge, and complex areas of regulation, experienced 
decisionmakers should be able to reach accurate decisions more 
quickly than generalist judges. 
The informational advantage of agencies over courts and 
legislators is at its greatest in rulemaking, where agencies have 
numerous tools and few limits on their ability to obtain the expertise 
and information they need. The situation is somewhat different for 
adjudication. First, the ALJs who make many decisions may initially 
have little specialized knowledge or experience in the area in which 
they adjudicate due to the hiring criteria used by the Office of 
Personnel Management (“OPM”).170 Second, once hired, prohibitions 
on ex parte communications and separation of functions limit whom 
many administrative judges may and may not consult.171 If agencies 
are not required to use an ALJ, they may require their adjudicators to 
have certain experience or expertise.172 But it is not clear how many 
agencies do so. In addition, the agency’s organic statute or its own 
regulations may further limit the expertise available to non–Article III 
adjudicators, even when they are not subject to the prohibitions 
 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to 
Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 415–16 (2007) (remarking that “[t]here are times when we 
simply have to learn to live with unequal justice because the alternatives are worse” and citing 
the costs of eroding “decisional independence” in particular). 
 169. Cass Sunstein calls “the choice of an administrative law judge to award or withhold 
disability benefits under the standards set out by the Social Security Act” a “legalistic decision” 
that could just as easily be decided by “state or federal judges.” Cass R. Sunstein, 
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 445 (1987). 
 170. See Michael Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella: Extending the APA’s Adjudication 
Provisions to All Evidentiary Hearings Required by Statute, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1003, 1009 (2004) 
(“The process allows little room for judgment and discretion, and affords agencies virtually no 
choice in which ALJs to hire. It does not take account of whether a new ALJ has specialized 
experience in the regulatory or beneficiary scheme administered by the agency.”). This is likely 
to change, however, in the wake of Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018) (holding that ALJs 
are officers of the United States who must be appointed under the Appointments Clause by the 
president or the “Heads of Departments”), and the Executive Order Excepting Administrative 
Law Judges from the Competitive Service, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 10, 2018) (excepting ALJs 
from the competitive hiring rules and examinations of the OPM).  
 171. See supra note 82 (discussing rules regarding ex parte communications and separation 
of functions applicable to ALJs and AJs). 
 172. See Emily S. Bremer, Designing the Decider, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 79 
(describing three examples of such employment requirements). 
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applicable to ALJs under the APA.173 Protecting the independence and 
neutrality of administrative judges is essential to ensuring the 
legitimacy of agency adjudication in light of its overt policymaking 
goals. But it also limits the ability of agencies to apply their 
institutional knowledge most efficiently. 
Nevertheless, many administrative judges become highly 
experienced in their regulatory areas over time. Unlike courts, which 
have a broad range of cases on their dockets, agency adjudicators 
typically hear very similar cases day after day. As Andrew Ceresney, 
the former director of the SEC Division of Enforcement, described it, 
[A]dministrative proceedings have the benefit of specialized factfinders. The ALJs are 
focused on hearing and deciding securities cases, year after year. They develop expert 
knowledge of the securities laws, and the types of entities, instruments, and practices 
that frequently appear in our cases. Many of our cases involve somewhat technical 
provisions of the securities laws, and ALJs become knowledgeable about these 
provisions.174 
Moreover, the agency heads typically authorized to make final agency 
decisions usually have access to all the agency’s staff, much like in 
rulemaking.175 Thus, compared to most federal judges, agency 
decisionmakers tend to possess greater familiarity with the relevant 
facts, issues, and law in the narrower range of cases they hear.  
2. Bolstering Agency Expertise Through Hybrid Enforcement 
Hybrid enforcement bolsters the information resources of 
agency adjudication. First, if the agency is a party to the dispute, it 
can provide the administrative judge with specialized expertise 
developed through its experience in the regulatory area. As repeat 
players, public enforcers should be skilled at presenting the agency’s 
knowledge and expertise in their cases.  
Second, the participation of private parties in enforcement 
supplements the information resources of the agency by bringing their 
situated knowledge of violations to the attention of regulators.176 
Indeed, private parties may supplement public enforcement efforts 
 
 173. See, e.g., Fisk & Malamud, supra note 96, at 2048 (noting a statutory limit on the 
NLRB’s adjudicative staff’s ability to employ the economic analysis of the Board’s Division of 
Economic Research). 
 174. Ceresney, supra note 150. 
 175. The APA does not place the same limits on internal communications involving the 
head(s) of the agency as it does on the initial agency adjudicators, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012), 
although restrictions on ex parte communications with interested parties outside the agency still 
apply, 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(1) (2012).  
 176. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1290; Thompson, supra note 30, at 192.  
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more effectively in agencies than in courts. Not only does private 
enforcement uncover violations that may have escaped a public 
enforcer’s attention, as in federal court, it also broadens and deepens 
the knowledge and expertise of public officials responsible for 
coordinating enforcement, adjudication, and rulemaking. Thus, the 
information derived from private complaints can be used by the 
agency not only in its own enforcement actions but also in rulemaking 
and other regulatory activities. For example, the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) “uses consumer complaints to inform its 
work in making prices and risks clearer, protecting consumers of 
financial products and services, and encouraging financial markets to 
operate fairly and competitively . . . [and] its thinking on credit cards, 
mortgages, bank products and services, vehicle and consumer loans, 
and private student loans.”177  
Thus, hybrid enforcement in administrative courts maximizes 
the information resources and expertise brought to bear in regulatory 
enforcement actions and enriches the expertise of the agency more 
generally. 
3. The Risks of Specialized Decisionmakers 
As agencies leverage their expertise, however, specialized 
decisionmakers create risks less present in generalist courts. These 
include the risk of “decision mills” in which adjudicators prejudge 
cases based on past experience and the need to process large numbers 
of claims, the risk of “agency capture” by regulated industries that 
repeatedly appear before the agency, and the risk of recurring 
backlogs caused by caseload volatility.  
a. Decision Mills 
Increased specialization creates a danger that agency 
adjudicators repeatedly presiding over the same types of cases and 
claims will fall victim to tunnel vision.178 This can occur both at the 
 
 177. Eric J. Mogilnicki & Melissa S. Malpass, The First Year of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau: An Overview, 68 BUS. LAW. 557, 568 (2013) (quoting CONSUMER RESPONSE, 
supra note 129). 
 178. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 11 (1993) (describing the phenomenon of tunnel vision); Stephanie Russell-Kraft, 
Rakoff Hopes SEC Will “Think Twice” About Using Admin Court, LAW360 (Mar. 3, 2015), 
https://www.law360.com/newyork/articles/627028 [https://perma.cc/PW5F-QFPQ] (reporting 
Judge Rakoff’s remarks on agency tunnel vision at a panel hosted by the New York City Bar 
Association). Justice Stephen Breyer describes the problem as the “single-minded pursuit of a 
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level of individual employees—such as adjudicators, who focus on one 
narrow task—and of the agency as a whole, which focuses on one 
category of problems. As the old adage puts it, “When you’re a 
hammer, everything looks like a nail.” Agency adjudicators may begin 
to make assumptions about the merits of individual claims based on 
the cases they typically hear, become overly sympathetic to legal 
interpretations that further their core mission without regard to 
countervailing concerns, and impose harsher penalties without regard 
to equitable considerations.179 Alternatively, they may become so jaded 
that they have a hard time seeing meritorious cases. Either way, the 
danger is that the agency becomes a decision mill. 
Agencies have several tools to address the risk of decision 
mills. First, most agencies employ multiple levels of review to check 
errors.180 Second, agencies sometimes sort cases based on whether 
they are routine, raise novel questions, or are likely to impact a large 
number of people. They may dispose of routine cases using a single 
adjudicator, nonprecedential decisions, or summary review, while 
funneling more complex cases to multijudge panels, more rigorous 
review, and precedential decisions to guide similar cases in the 
future.181 
Nevertheless, multiple layers of review, particularly when 
combined with subsequent judicial review, may delay final resolution 
of the matter, thus undermining the goal of access to justice. In 
addition, early sorting of cases may exacerbate tunnel vision by 
increasing the likelihood of adjudicators prejudging the merits of 
cases. Thus, the problem of decision mills is not always easy to solve. 
b. Agency Capture 
Specialized decisionmakers may also start to favor the industry 
they are meant to regulate. If adjudicators are chosen for their 
experience and expertise, there is a good chance they gained that 
 
single goal too far, to the point where it brings about more harm than good.” BREYER, supra, at 
11. 
 179. See David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155 (2016) 
(arguing the SEC has fallen prey to these issues).  
 180. See Russell L. Weaver, Appellate Review in Executive Departments and Agencies, 48 
ADMIN. L. REV. 251, 253–70 (1996) (examining the appellate structures used in various federal 
agencies). 
 181. For example, “routine” cases brought in front of the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation Appeals Board and the Veterans Court are decided by individual Board members or 
Veteran Court judges, whereas novel or significant matters that impact a large number of 
parties are decided by three-judge panels. See 29 C.F.R. § 4003.61 (2018). 
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experience working for regulated parties, possibly even appearing 
before the agency in administrative proceedings. Thus, they may come 
to the agency with preconceived notions about how cases should be 
resolved.  
There is a long literature on agency capture and the danger is 
not peculiar to adjudication.182 In some ways, ALJs are less 
susceptible to regulatory capture than other agency officials. ALJs 
have the kind of job protections and long-term tenure that are 
incompatible with the economic theory of agency capture.183 In 
addition, they are probably less susceptible to the more subtle version 
of the theory, which posits that agencies are systematically biased 
toward regulated entities because they need good relationships with 
industry to get information.184 ALJs are not dependent on industry in 
this way, even when they come from industry before joining the 
agency.  
Still, critics of specialized courts argue they are susceptible to 
capture by repeat players in administrative proceedings, particularly 
if those parties are cohesive, well-resourced, and unopposed by 
countervailing interest groups.185 The same concerns may be relevant 
to administrative judges who preside over similar cases involving 
repeat players day after day. Unlike legislative courts, however, 
administrative agencies are supervised by political appointees who 
review the initial adjudicators’ decisions.186 Thus, it seems more likely 
that agency adjudicators will tack toward agency leadership than 
 
 182. The concept of agency capture first appeared in the public choice literature arguing that 
the political process is driven by economic rather than ideological interests. See, e.g., George J. 
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971). For a 
classic study of capture in four agencies, see PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL 
REGULATORY AGENCIES (1981). See also Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory 
Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 
(1990) (reviewing agency capture literature); Stewart, supra note 60, at 1685 & nn.75–76.  
 183. The primary mechanism of capture traditionally has been assumed to be the prospect of 
future employment in the regulated industry. See QUIRK, supra note 182, at 143–74. 
 184. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 60, at 1684–87 (describing why agencies are predisposed 
to favor interests of regulated industry). 
 185. See David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative 
Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 72 (1975) (collecting claims of bias 
against legislative and administrative courts); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A 
Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 29 (1989) (“Where adversaries are 
imbalanced . . . judges may become more easily swayed by those who appear before them 
frequently, and by the policy arguments that they hear most often.”); see also Paul R. Gugliuzza, 
Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1456–57 (2012) (describing the 
influence of industry and the patent bar in the creation of the Federal Circuit). 
 186. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article 
III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, (1988) (discussing the tension between this reality and the demands 
of Article III); Weaver, supra note 180, at 252. 
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toward the regulated industry.187 If the agency leadership is 
committed, they may be able to disrupt the capture of lower-level 
decisionmakers, although agency heads sometimes have difficulty 
controlling independent administrative judges.188 But if the agency 
leadership itself comes from industry, they may only exacerbate 
capture. 
c. Caseload Volatility  
Finally, specialization exposes administrative courts to acute 
challenges with volatile caseloads. As Judge Richard Posner notes, 
“[T]he federal appellate caseload as a whole changes less from year to 
year than the components of that caseload.”189 Thus, even as dramatic 
growth in appeals from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
stretched the capacity of the circuit courts, the reduction in other 
components of their dockets offered some relief.190 Because agencies 
are typically dealing with a specific subject area, however, they are at 
greater risk of dramatic increases in their caseloads without any 
compensating decrease.191 This inevitably creates delays and backlogs 
as the agency scrambles to hire more adjudicators or find other ways 
to streamline its decisionmaking process, none of which may be 
realistic.192 Such delays and backlogs are worst when an agency is 
adjudicating claims drawn from a large pool of potential beneficiaries 
with changing demographics. But even agencies with smaller dockets 
may experience this problem unless they are able to borrow 
 
 187. Of course, the agency leadership may in some cases come from the regulated industry. 
See, e.g., Danielle Ivory & Robert Faturechi, The Deep Industry Ties of Trump’s Deregulation 
Teams, N.Y. TIMES, (July 11, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2v6AHAb [https://perma.cc/7YPC-4RN7]. 
Section III.C addresses what this Article describes as “political capture,” which occurs when the 
political branches seek to undermine an agency’s statutory mandate. The line between “political 
capture” and “regulatory capture” is not always clear, but generally understood, the traditional 
form of agency capture is driven by the structural relationship between an agency and its 
regulated industry, while political capture is driven by the political appointees at the top of the 
agency. 
 188. Social Security Administration ALJs are a well-known example of initial 
decisionmakers that an agency has had difficulty controlling. 
 189. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 259–60 
(1999). 
 190. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics 
-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2018 (last visited Jan. 19, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ 
M6MN-F9DK] (“BIA appeals accounted for 81 percent of administrative agency appeals and 
constituted the largest category of administrative agency appeals filed in each circuit except the 
DC Circuit.”).   
 191. See Engstrom, supra note 151, at 1689–90 (citing examples of volatile caseloads at the 
Vaccine Court, Department of Veterans Affairs, and other specialized tribunals).  
 192. Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 164, at 805. 
Sant’Ambrogio_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/26/2019  2:13 PM 
2019] PRIVATE ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT  469 
 
adjudicators from other agencies. Thus, specialization may threaten 
some of the expeditiousness sought by administrative courts. 
4. Mitigating the Risks of Specialization Through  
Hybrid Enforcement 
Hybrid enforcement can mitigate some of the risks of 
specialization. First, the involvement of both private parties and 
agency officials in administrative proceedings exposes agencies to 
multiple enforcement inputs. Agreements among public and private 
enforcers may signal strong cases, while disagreements may 
encourage adjudicators to scrutinize the facts of individual cases more 
closely, thus disrupting decision mills. 
Second, hybrid enforcement mitigates the risks of agency 
capture. The right of private parties to file complaints in agency 
proceedings, trigger investigations, and obtain reasoned decisions on 
their claims ensures that regulatory beneficiaries are heard. The more 
robust the private rights, the louder their voices. Moreover, when an 
agency cozies up to a regulated industry, the shift will be more 
transparent if the agency is required to give reasons for ruling against 
claimants.193 These benefits of private enforcement will be at their 
greatest when private parties are entitled to decisions based on the 
record of an evidentiary hearing. 
The bifurcated decisionmaking of agency adjudication also 
reduces the risk of capture because administrative judges and political 
appointees who make final agency decisions have different 
perspectives and relationships to the regulatory and political 
environments. It should be more difficult for industry to capture both 
sets of decisionmakers. Differences between them in deciding cases 
will also make capture more transparent if each decisionmaker must 
issue reasoned decisions on the record.  
Finally, public enforcement can help agencies control caseload 
volatility.194 Agency investigations and mediation efforts help resolve 
cases before they proceed to evidentiary hearings. If the agency 
possesses exclusive authority to pursue complaints or acts as 
gatekeeper to private complaints, it  need only advance enforcement 
 
 193. See Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1281 
(2009) (“[R]eason-giving promotes accountability by facilitating transparency in government.”).  
 194. Jonathan B. Rosenblum, A New Look at the General Counsel’s Unreviewable Discretion 
Not to Issue a Complaint Under the NLRA, 86 YALE L.J. 1349, 1357 & n.32 (1977) (“Only [the 
NLRB’s] centralized control over enforcement proceedings could prevent the agency from being 
inundated with routine work and free it to stake out the major parameters of the Wagner Act.”). 
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actions that can be adjudicated in a timely manner. Not surprisingly, 
the worst backlogs in agency adjudication occur in large benefits 
programs in which private parties have autonomy over whether to 
pursue their claims and the procedures are designed to make it easy 
for them to do so.195 Agency control over which complaints are 
docketed for an evidentiary hearing, however, may limit the ability of 
private parties to serve as a strong check on agency capture. 
Thus, agency designers can employ different attributes of 
public and private enforcement to enhance agency expertise and 
mitigate the dangers of decision mills, agency capture, and caseload 
volatility. But no single combination will address all the risks 
associated with specialized decisionmakers. Strong private rights of 
action can address the problem of decision mills and capture, but at 
the same time it risks caseload volatility by decreasing agency control 
over enforcement. 
C. Implementing Coherent and Politically Accountable  
Public Policy 
Another common justification for delegating decisions to 
agencies is their ability to implement a more coherent national policy 
with greater accountability to the political branches.196 Public 
enforcement in administrative courts enhances agencies’ power to 
make uniform national policy; facilitates the coordination of 
policymaking across enforcement, adjudication, and rulemaking;197 
 
 195. See, e.g., BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, FISCAL YEAR 2008 REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN 3 
(2009), http://www.va.gov/Vetapp/ChairRpt/BVA2008AR.pdf [https://perma.cc/495P-GKQ6] 
(describing a year in which each “Veterans Law Judge” adjudicated 729 benefits cases); Eckholm, 
supra note 149 (describing waiting periods of over five hundred days for social security disability 
claims); Nancy J. Griswold, Appellant Forum – Update from OMHA, OFF. MEDICARE HEARINGS & 
APPEALS (June 25, 2015), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/omha/OMHA Medicare 
Appellant Forum/presentations_june_25_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/2L5L-N2DY] (describing 
exploding backlog and growing processing times for claims adjudicated by the Office of Medicare 
Hearing and Appeals).  
 196. It is of course true, notwithstanding the disavowals of nominees to the Supreme Court, 
that courts make policy. But policymaking by courts, at least outside the constitutional context, 
has less legitimacy than policymaking by politically accountable institutions. For this reason, 
courts frequently try to minimize or hide their policymaking. 
 197. An important exception is the split enforcement regime, in which one agency makes the 
final decisions in adjudication and another agency is responsible for rulemaking. For example, 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act gives rulemaking and enforcement power to the 
Secretary of Labor, 29 U.S.C. § 665 (2012), but delegates the adjudication of enforcement actions 
to the Occupational Safety and Health Commission, 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (2012). Similarly, 
under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review 
Commission adjudicates enforcement actions brought by the Department of Labor. 30 U.S.C. 
§§ 815, 823 (2012). 
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and gives agencies greater flexibility to adapt over time. At the same 
time, however, adjudication by politically accountable policymakers 
risks over- and underdeterrence and threatens the right of private 
respondents to receive individualized decisions. Agencies address 
these concerns in different ways. On the one hand, the bifurcation of 
agency decisionmaking and judicial review addresses the danger of 
overzealous enforcement. On the other hand, private enforcement 
rights mitigate the danger of agency capture by political principals, or 
at least make such capture more transparent. 
1. Using Public Enforcement to Implement Policy 
Public enforcement in agency adjudication enhances the power 
of agencies to implement regulatory statutes in light of their policy 
goals. Congress inevitably leaves gaps and ambiguities in its statutory 
commands. How such gaps are filled and ambiguities resolved often 
has important policy implications.198 Agencies approach these gaps 
and ambiguities differently than courts.199 Courts generally strive to 
reach what they consider to be the best understanding of the law 
using all the tools of statutory interpretation. Agencies use many of 
the same tools, but often use them differently.200 For example, 
whereas some courts disavow legislative history, agencies tend to 
emphasize it.201 More importantly, agency interpretations of law are 
shaped by their regulatory agendas and subject-matter expertise. 
Agencies openly consider the policy implications of their 
 
 198. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) 
(noting that “the meaning or reach of a statute” often requires “a full understanding of the force 
of the statutory policy in the given situation”). 
 199. There is a rich body of literature comparing the different approaches of courts and 
agencies to interpreting the law. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s 
Choice of Delegate: Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 366 
(2010) (“[T]he choice of delegate may be every bit as important as the choice to delegate.”); 
Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the 
Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1038 (2006) (discussing the 
characteristics of agencies and courts “that might influence whether a rational legislator would 
prefer to delegate authority to interpret an ambiguous statute” to one over the other).  
 200. See generally Glen Staszewski, Introduction to Symposium on Administrative Statutory 
Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (introducing symposium articles “explor[ing] the 
nature of statutory interpretation by administrative agencies in the modern regulatory state”). 
 201. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. 
REV. 901, 929 (2013) (finding that Congress drafts “both text and history . . . with agency 
implementation in mind and often with agencies at the table”); id. at 972 (claiming that drafters 
frequently “single[ ] out agencies as a key audience for legislative history”). 
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interpretations,202 whereas courts may ignore, avoid, or not entirely 
understand those implications. Agencies may also consider nonlegal 
values, such as paternalism, bureaucratic rationality, and distinct 
professional norms.203 Finally, agencies are likely to treat “different 
interpretive questions in an ideologically consistent manner,” whereas 
courts are less able to see across diverse interpretive questions within 
a given regulatory area.204  
Agencies are also influenced by their understanding of 
congressional and White House preferences because they are highly 
dependent on the approval of the political branches.205 Federal judges, 
by contrast, are largely insulated from politics. Although judges are 
nominated and confirmed by the Senate, it is usually impossible to 
know the specific cases that any federal judge is likely to hear. Aside 
from a few hot-button issues, the Senate avoids focusing on the policy 
perspectives of judicial nominees. In contrast, the issues heard by an 
agency are clearly delineated and the political branches focus on the 
policy perspectives of executive branch nominees. Moreover, once 
appointed, judges are not subject to White House review or removal, 
unlike agency leadership. Finally, it is exceedingly difficult for 
Congress to influence specific judicial interpretations ex post through 
appropriations or correcting legislation. Thus, even independent 
multimember commissions with appointees drawn from both parties 
are more dependent on Congress and aligned with the president who 
nominated them than federal judges.  
a. Uniformity and Flexibility 
Public enforcement in agency adjudication allows agencies to 
implement more uniform national policies while retaining greater 
flexibility to change their policies over time. By bringing enforcement 
actions in an administrative rather than a judicial forum, the claims 
are resolved using the agency’s understanding of the statute in light of 
 
 202. See Aaron J. Saiger, Agencies’ Obligation to Interpret the Statute, 69 VAND. L. REV. 
1231, 1293–94 (2016) (arguing that agencies should instead seek the best interpretation of a 
statute rather than a reasonable interpretation that aligns with their policymaking agenda); see 
also Evan J. Criddle, The Constitution of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 69 VAND. L. REV. EN 
BANC 325 (2016) (responding to Professor Saiger’s arguments). 
 203. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY CLAIMS 23–34 (1983). 
 204. Stephenson, supra note 199, at 1047. 
 205. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 887–88 (1974) (describing agencies as “eager[ ] to serve 
the current legislature”). Most agency leadership is appointed by and may be removed by the 
president or one of the heads of the departments. 
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its policy goals, rather than the views of any one of the 2,758 federal 
district judges. Moreover, federal courts may offer conflicting 
interpretations of the law until the Supreme Court resolves the 
relevant question.206 Although judicial review of agency adjudication 
can also create inconsistencies in regulation, this risk is moderated by 
judicial deference to agency interpretations,207 the concentration of 
administrative review in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,208 
and the ability of agencies to “nonacquiesce” in certain judicial 
opinions.209  
At the same time, agencies have more flexibility to change 
their positions over time by bringing enforcement actions in 
administrative courts. Agency adjudication is not typically bound by 
stare decisis, while courts are bound by “super-strong” stare decisis 
when interpreting statutory provisions.210 Thus, agencies may adjust 
their legal interpretations in response to changes in their regulatory 
environments or shifts in the political winds.211 Courts, by contrast, 
are more likely to bring stability to the interpretation of the law over 
time, shifting course incrementally as stare decisis permits. This can 
be a virtue or a vice depending on the comparative value of flexibility 
versus stability in a given context.212 
b. Guidance to Nonparties 
Agencies can provide more guidance to nonparties than courts. 
While courts are prohibited from issuing advisory opinions, agencies 
 
 206. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 199, at 428–29 (noting the “substantial time lag” before the 
Supreme Court is typically able to resolve lower courts’ misinterpretations). 
 207. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (recognizing a level of deference 
for formal adjudication); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844–
45 (1984) (recognizing a higher level of deference for reasonable agency interpretations of 
statutory ambiguity). 
 208. See Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between 
Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 232 (1996). 
 209. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 74, at 694–99, 706–10, 713–14 (discussing the 
NLRB’s and IRS’s nonacquiescence policies); Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. 
Benson, and Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J. 1815, 1825 (1989) (“Justice Rehnquist 
has suggested that any judicially imposed restraint on agency nonacquiescence usurps the 
authority of the political branches of the government.”). 
 210. Stephenson, supra note 199, at 1047 (citing William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling 
Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988)). 
 211. Id. at 1047 & n.51, 1048 & n.52 (citing examples). 
 212. See Michael Sant’Ambrogio, The Extra-Legislative Veto, 102 GEO. L.J. 351, 392 (2014) 
(noting how presidential control over agency decisionmaking can undermine the stability of 
government policy). Professor Stephenson suggests that the stability of courts across time may 
be more valuable when reliance interests are at stake. See Stephenson, supra note 199, at 1058–
59. 
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are encouraged to do so. While courts are institutionally adverse to 
deciding more than is necessary, nothing prevents agencies from doing 
so.213 While it is accepted that civil judgments will have retroactive 
effect, administrative law attempts to limit the unfair surprise of new 
agency policies that might upset settled reliance interests.214 Agencies 
remain forward-looking in their decisions, seeking to guide those not 
party to the proceeding. Public enforcement in agency adjudication 
allows agencies to offer such guidance without relying on the federal 
courts, which may be unwilling to provide it. 
c. Coordination Across Policymaking Forms 
Administrative enforcement also helps the head of the agency 
coordinate policy across enforcement, adjudication, and rulemaking. 
Public enforcement authority allows the agency to decide whether to 
use rulemaking or adjudication to implement policy without waiting 
for a private party to file the right case. If the agency also adjudicates 
private enforcement actions, the agency can decide these cases 
consistent with its own enforcement priorities and policy goals. In 
addition, agency staff responsible for different functions may benefit 
from the exchange of knowledge and experience made possible by the 
integration of these activities in a single institution.215 For example, 
the CFPB has included enforcement attorneys in its examinations of 
regulated entities to “detect[ ] and assess[ ] risks to consumers and to 
markets for consumer financial products and services.”216 According to 
former director Richard Cordray, such coordination helps “the 
supervision teams to understand where enforcement works, and why 
 
 213. See, e.g., Emily S. Bremer, The Agency Declaratory Judgment, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1169, 
1178 (2017) (discussing agencies’ ability to issue “binding rulings capable of providing clear and 
certain guidance to regulated parties without requiring those parties first act on peril of 
sanction”). 
 214. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (requiring 
agencies to “provide a more detailed justification . . . when . . . its new policy rests upon factual 
findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy; or when its prior policy has 
engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account”); NLRB. v. Bell Aerospace 
Co. Div. of Textron, 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974) (limiting agencies’ ability to change policy in 
adjudication when “new liability is sought to be imposed on individuals for past actions which 
were taken in good-faith reliance on Board pronouncements”). 
 215. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 180, at 289 (noting how integration facilitates “awareness 
of how a regulatory system is functioning”). 
 216. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5514(b)(1)(C), 5515(b)(1)(C) (2012). 
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and how,” and helps “the enforcement team to understand how 
supervision and examinations work.”217  
Finally, because the head of the agency typically makes the 
final decision in all modes of decisionmaking, she can coordinate these 
activities and refer issues that arise in adjudicatory proceedings to the 
staff involved in rulemaking.218 Adjudication allows agencies to 
address new issues unanticipated by their rules. But it also allows 
them to identify issues that arise in multiple cases and therefore may 
be appropriate for rulemaking.219 Furthermore, the agency’s 
adjudicators can provide a thoughtful first crack at a general rule by 
personnel who see the cases that a rule might resolve more efficiently, 
consistently, and fairly.220 
2. The Risks of Overdeterrence and Underdeterrence 
The overt policymaking character of agencies carries similar 
risks to specialization. On the one hand, agencies may become 
overzealous in their enforcement. They may become too focused on 
narrow policy goals and overly aggressive in how they pursue and 
decide cases.221 Respondents in SEC administrative proceedings, for 
example, have complained that SEC ALJs reflect the “mind-set” of the 
 
 217. Dave Clarke, U.S. Consumer Cop Says Not Bullying Banks, REUTERS (Mar. 29, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/29/financial-regulation-cfpb-idUSL2E8ET7XL20120329 
[https://perma.cc/W3L3-FZDB]. 
 218. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 180, at 289 (“A decision writer in one agency stated that 
during meetings regarding the content of an adjudicative opinion, she has seen the agency head 
tell subordinates to change a regulatory scheme.”). The 1981 Model State Administrative 
Procedure Act (“MSAPA”) contained a provision that “as soon as feasible, and to the extent 
practicable, [agencies must] adopt rules . . . embodying appropriate standards, principles, and 
procedural safeguards that the agency will apply to the law it administers.” MODEL STATE 
ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 2-104(3) (amended 2010), 14 U.L.A. 73 (1981). This was abandoned in 
the 2010 MSAPA. Nevertheless, some states have adopted similar requirements favoring 
rulemaking whenever practicable. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(a) (2018); IOWA CODE § 17A.3(1)(c) 
(2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-3-201(2)–(4) (West 2018).  
 219. For example, after an experienced adjudicator at the NVICP found a causal link 
between the rubella vaccine and chronic arthritis, the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
modified the Vaccine Injury Table to include “chronic arthritis” as an injury associated with the 
rubella vaccine. See National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Revision of the Vaccine 
Injury Table, 60 Fed. Reg. 7,678, 7,692 (Feb. 8, 1995), revised by National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program: Revisions and Additions to the Vaccine Injury Table—2, 62 Fed. Reg. 
7,685, 7,688 (Feb. 20, 1997). Similarly, the SSA’s medical-vocational guidelines were 
promulgated in response to hearing many similar claims in adjudicatory proceedings. See 
Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461 n.2 (1983).  
 220. Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 1688–89; see also Weaver, supra note 
180, at 289 (“Those who decide cases arising from a regulatory program have a unique 
perspective on the functioning of that program.”). 
 221. See Zaring, supra note 179, at 1217–18.  
Sant’Ambrogio_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/26/2019  2:13 PM 
476 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2:425 
 
agency’s enforcement agenda.222 Furthermore, coordination of 
enforcement actions with other agency functions raises concerns that 
the agency is not adjudicating cases based on their individual merit 
but in pursuit of broader policy goals.223  
On the other hand, greater agency control over enforcement 
risks “political capture.” If the agency’s political principals oppose the 
agency’s underlying statutory goals, they may block regulatory 
enforcement in part or in whole. Agency control over enforcement 
makes it possible for an administration to undermine the statutory 
mandate and prevent private parties and the public writ large from 
obtaining remedies for regulatory violations.224  
Consequently, enhanced political control over enforcement may 
result in large swings in enforcement, upsetting the reliance interests 
of private parties and undermining the rule of law.225 Therefore, 
agency designers must guard against over- and underenforcement and 
the destabilization of government policy from administration to 
administration. 
3. Checks on Overzealous Enforcement 
The procedures intended to make agencies more like courts 
create checks on overzealous enforcement.226 Prohibitions on ex parte 
communications and separation of functions restrain the agency’s 
ability to implement policy without regard to the private interests at 
 
 222. Id. at 1214 (citing complaints reported in the news). 
 223. See also Clarke, supra note 217 (noting complaint by regulated entities that “the 
presence of enforcement staff during routine inspection visits to banks [constituted] an 
intimidation technique”). See generally Mogilnicki & Malpass, supra note 177, at 557. 
 224. See Engstrom, supra note 12, at 621 (“Given that private enforcement is designed at 
least in part to counter possible agency capture, bringing agencies back into the picture risks 
returning the fox to the henhouse.”). 
 225. In The Morality of Law, Lon Fuller identifies “frequent changes in rules that the subject 
cannot orient his action by them” as one of eight ways in which a legal system may “misfire.” 
LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (1969); see also Minzner, supra note 109, at 2116 
(explaining that specialists are particularly vulnerable to political pressure and “[f]ollowing 
major enforcement failures . . . the political salience of enforcement switches and 
overenforcement can result”); Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 212, at 392 (“[T]he difficulty of 
changing the legal background regime allows parties to order their affairs with greater certainty 
about the future. This in turn makes them more willing to invest in the future, increasing the 
productive activity of society.”).  
 226. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 
1189, 1265–66 (1986) (“When an agency adjudicates it is required to assume a different posture 
from its rulemaking mode. It must proceed roughly as a court would in determining the merits of 
an individual claim.”). 
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stake.227 “Once hired, an ALJ has virtual lifetime tenure without any 
probationary period. . . . This set of provisions guarantees ALJ 
independence” and challenges political control over adjudication.228 
Although other administrative judges have less independence, they 
still tend to have some—sometimes a lot—and view themselves as 
judges.229 The relative independence of these decisionmakers is meant 
to serve as a check on the risks created by the strong public character 
of enforcement in agency adjudication. Independent administrative 
judges encourage agencies to articulate the standards under which 
public enforcement actions are judged and enhance the transparency 
of changes in agency policy.230 
Of course, final agency decisions are usually in the hands of 
political appointees. Political appointees approach adjudication from a 
different perspective than administrative judges and seek to 
implement administration policy. Consequently, agency leadership 
may serve as an additional check on overzealous enforcement or may 
be a cause of it. Some argue that political appointees check the tunnel 
vision of civil service employees because they come to their jobs with a 
fresh perspective and more political accountability.231 But political 
appointees may also seek to push the agency to be more aggressive in 
its enforcement. It depends on the policy goals of the administration.  
Finally, and most importantly, judicial review serves as a check 
on overzealous enforcement based on legal interpretations that are not 
reasonable. Giving private parties aggrieved by agency action the 
right to judicial review of final agency action inconsistent with its 
 
 227. Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 
1032, 1075 (2011) (explaining that the APA and Due Process Clause provide agency adjudicators 
with “some level of independence” and “[p]olicymakers . . . have sometimes found adjudicators 
frustrating precisely because of” how independence impacts “adjudication’s inefficiency and 
inconsistency as a policymaking instrument”); Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections Upon the Federal 
Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1354 (1992) (describing “the continuing saga of 
the SSA’s attempts to place productivity and quality-control standards on the ALJs who decide 
its disability cases”); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: 
An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950-1990, 80 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1414, 1473 (2012) (“[A]dministrative law judges . . . enjoy some measure of decisional 
independence from other agency staff, including from senior policymakers.”). 
 228. Asimow, supra note 170, at 1009. 
 229. See Koch, supra note 82, at 278–81. 
 230. The role that independent ALJs play in balancing the policymaking agenda of agencies 
supports calls for more, not less, independence. Cf. Kent Barnett, Why Bias Challenges to 
Administrative Adjudication Should Succeed, 81 MO. L. REV. 1023 (2016) (arguing that non-ALJ 
adjudication of disputes between agencies and nongovernmental parties violates due process). 
 231. Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1858 
(2015); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Reins Act and the Struggle to Control Agency Rulemaking, 16 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 185 (2013). 
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organic statute allows Congress to leverage private resources to 
monitor and police agency drift.232 Thus, to the extent that bifurcated 
decisionmaking fails to restrain overzealous enforcement or the 
political leadership pushes the agency to overreach, federal courts 
serve as a final check on agency action beyond its statutory authority.  
4. Private Enforcement as a Check on Political Capture 
The tools that check overzealous enforcement are not as 
effective at checking underenforcement. While agency action provides 
a focus for adjudication by independent decisionmakers, 
administrative judges never decide cases not brought.233 Although the 
APA gives courts the power to compel “agency action unlawfully 
withheld or unreasonably delayed,”234 the Supreme Court has 
generally shielded an agency’s decision not to bring an enforcement 
action from judicial review.235 The main hurdle is the presumption 
against the reviewability of enforcement decisions under the APA 
announced by the Supreme Court in Heckler v. Chaney.236 There are 
exceptions to the presumption and some debate about whether it 
applies to enforcement policies or only individual enforcement 
decisions.237 Nevertheless, the presumption gives agencies significant 
latitude in their enforcement choices.238 Moreover, sometimes it is 
difficult even to know whether an agency has adopted an explicit 
enforcement policy against bringing certain types of cases.239  
 
 232. Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political 
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 271–73 (1987). 
 233. See Staszewski, supra note 27 (proposing the establishment of a “Federal Inaction 
Commission” to address the chronic problem of nonenforcement decisions and other regulatory 
inaction). 
 234. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012). 
 235. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832–33 (1985). 
 236. Id. 
 237. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 176–77 
(1996) (describing debate); Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 27, at 1406 n.115 (discussing exceptions).  
 238. This is not to say that determined lower courts can never find a way around the 
presumption. As an example, the lower courts did check the Obama administration’s use of 
enforcement discretion to change immigration policy. But the Supreme Court deadlocked in the 
case and never provided a reasoned opinion. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016). 
 239. Andrias, supra note 26, at 1043 (noting that changes in agency enforcement policies 
typically do not require procedures to enhance transparency). For example, during President 
George W. Bush’s first term, the Employment Litigation Section of the DOJ did not file a single 
lawsuit alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination against African Americans and the 
number of individual cases challenging racial discrimination fell dramatically. CITIZENS’ COMM’N 
ON CIVIL RIGHTS & CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE EROSION OF RIGHTS: DECLINING CIVIL RIGHTS 
ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 29 (William L. Taylor et al. eds., 2007), 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2007/03/pdf/civil_rights_report.pdf 
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Private enforcement mechanisms mitigate the dangers of 
political capture of agency enforcement, or at least increase its 
transparency. Private parties with procedural rights in administrative 
schemes are not completely dependent on public enforcers. If agencies 
must respond to the complaints of private parties and provide reasons 
for not pursuing enforcement actions, the agency’s decisionmaking 
will be more transparent. If private parties have an independent right 
to demand evidentiary hearings on their claims, they need not wait on 
agency enforcement at all. But even where public enforcement is 
exclusive and private parties are only entitled to agency review of 
their complaints, if the enforcement decision is subject to clear 
standards, administrative appeal, and judicial review, the private 
parties will likely have quicker and potentially more effective recourse 
than in a pure public enforcement scheme where citizens must 
challenge agency inaction. In addition, the agency may be less likely to 
take legally indefensible positions when subject to public, political, 
and judicial scrutiny. Finally, increased transparency facilitates 
congressional oversight and affords citizens the opportunity to 
respond at the ballot box. 
*      *      * 
In sum, combining elements of public and private enforcement 
in administrative courts facilitates the goals of agency adjudication 
while mitigating some of the risks it poses to legitimate 
decisionmaking. Public enforcers assist private parties seeking 
regulatory benefits, thus allowing agency adjudication to provide 
greater legal access to remedies while maintaining greater procedural 
protections for regulated parties. The procedural rights of regulatory 
beneficiaries encourage them to supplement the information resources 
of public regulators at the same time as specialized decisionmakers 
avail themselves of the experience acquired through hearing many 
similar cases in a discrete area of law. Public enforcement allows 
agencies to pursue consistent policies across different modes of 
 
[https://perma.cc/Z8S8-ZKWB]. But the DOJ did not completely abandon race discrimination 
claims, even as it shifted resources to “reverse discrimination” claims on behalf of white 
Americans, religious discrimination claims, and human trafficking. Id.; Charlie Savage, Justice 
Department to Recharge Civil Rights Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/01/us/politics/01rights.html [https://perma.cc/F3NW-VY9N] 
(“Under the Bush administration, the agency shifted away from its traditional core focus on 
accusations of racial discrimination, channeling resources into areas like religious discrimination 
and human trafficking.”). There was no final agency action memorializing the shift in policy that 
a party could challenge in court. 
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decisionmaking, while the procedural rights of private parties 
mitigate the risks of political capture, or at least make it more 
transparent.  
Table 3 summarizes the goals of agency adjudication, the tools 
used to achieve them, the risks they create, and the functions of public 
and private enforcement. 
TABLE 3: GOALS AND RISKS OF AGENCY ADJUDICATION 
 Goal  
 
Legal access 
Decisionmaking 
Informed by 
Expertise 
Coherent and  
Accountable 
Policy 
Tools Informal and 
tailored 
procedures 
Specialized 
decisionmakers; 
agency expertise 
Political 
appointees; 
agency forum 
Risks Inaccurate and 
illegitimate 
decisions 
“Decision mills”; 
“agency capture”; 
caseload volatility 
Illegitimate 
decisions; 
“political 
capture” 
Public  
Enforcement 
Assists 
regulatory 
beneficiaries; 
maintains 
process for 
respondents 
Reduces caseload 
volatility; checks 
decision mills and 
certain capture 
Enables 
policymaking 
using 
enforcement; 
enhances 
coordination and 
political 
accountability 
Private 
Enforcement 
Furthers legal 
access 
Supplements 
agency 
information; 
checks agency 
capture 
Checks political 
capture; 
enhances 
transparency 
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IV. STRUCTURING HYBRID ENFORCEMENT IN AGENCY ADJUDICATION 
Agencies use attributes of public and private enforcement in 
various combinations. Yet many administrative schemes cluster on 
the public side of the enforcement continuum.240 Part IV explains this 
tendency and suggests factors for policymakers to consider when 
designing administrative enforcement.  
A. Comparing Private Enforcement in Two Forums 
Private enforcement in administrative and judicial forums 
share many similarities. But there are also important differences. 
These differences may explain why agency designers often leverage 
the information resources of private parties without giving them 
independent enforcement authority.  
1. Comparing the Benefits in Each Forum 
Private parties supplement public enforcement in both judicial 
and administrative forums. Public enforcers face the same resource 
constraints in administrative courts as they do in federal court, even if 
administrative enforcement is less expensive.241 Thus, regardless of 
the forum, private parties allow Congress to leverage private 
resources in pursuit of public goods. 
Private parties do a particularly good job supplementing the 
information resources of agencies in administrative enforcement. Even 
when agencies have exclusive enforcement authority, public actions 
often originate in the complaints and investigations triggered by 
private parties.242 Moreover, unlike private enforcement in federal 
court, the knowledge of private parties is fed directly into the agency’s 
administrative process and considered by the agency leadership. As a 
result, the information derived from private complaints improves the 
agency’s understanding of its regulatory environment and informs 
rulemaking and other activities beyond enforcement and 
adjudication.243  
The success of private enforcement at checking or providing an 
alternative to agency capture, as it does in federal court, has been 
more limited, however. Without the power to obtain decisions on 
 
 240. See supra Part III and infra Appendix A. 
 241. SKOWRONEK, supra note 91, at 146; Verkuil, supra note 227, at 1344. 
 242. See, e.g., KOCH, supra note 13, § 5:31. 
 243. See supra notes 215–218 and accompanying text. 
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complaints based on the record of an evidentiary hearing, private 
enforcement in administrative courts cannot provide the same 
alternative to public enforcement as private rights of action in federal 
court. Procedural rights to file complaints alone will do little to check 
an agency that is opposed to enforcement due to the presumption 
against the reviewability of enforcement decisions announced in 
Heckler v. Chaney.244 Even the power to trigger an investigation and 
the right to an agency decision on whether to proceed with 
enforcement are unlikely to move an agency that is determined not to 
act given highly deferential judicial review, even if a written decision 
will enhance the transparency of public policy. Private parties can 
only serve as a check on captured enforcement, however, when they 
have enforcement rights analogous to private rights of action in 
federal court—i.e., the right to a reasoned decision from the agency 
based on the record of an evidentiary hearing. 
But even private rights of action comparable to those in federal 
court will not have the same impact as private enforcement in 
administrative courts if the agency is committed to a more 
conservative enforcement policy. Because of judicial deference to 
agency decisions in formal adjudication, courts are unlikely to second-
guess an agency’s refusal to adopt a novel interpretation of law in 
response to a private complaint. Private parties in court, by contrast, 
may find a judge they can persuade to push the law in a new direction.  
2. Comparing the Costs in Each Forum 
The core objection to private enforcement in federal court is 
that it upsets carefully calibrated public enforcement schemes.245 This 
objection is not as salient in administrative courts. Because the agency 
generally makes the final decision in agency adjudication and its 
interpretations are granted deference from reviewing courts, there is 
less risk that private parties will upset regulatory policy by bringing 
novel, adventuresome claims inconsistent with the agency’s 
understanding of its statutory mandate. Agencies can reject such 
claims and the federal courts will generally defer to the agency on 
review, so long as the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. Thus, 
agencies are better equipped to protect their enforcement policies from 
private enforcement in agency adjudication than in federal court.  
 
 244. 470 U.S. 821, 832–33 (1985). 
 245. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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There is also less danger that private enforcement in 
administrative courts will be driven by short-term financial incentives 
rather than the public interest.246 This critique is largely aimed at tort 
actions that yield large monetary awards, such as federal damage 
class actions.247 There are fewer monetary awards available to private 
parties in agency adjudication and those that do exist are generally 
smaller than in federal court.248 This might change if agencies adopt 
class actions in private enforcement schemes with monetary remedies 
rather than injunctive relief. But to date, administrative class actions 
have largely been used to resolve claims against the government.249 
The relative absence of large monetary awards to private parties in 
agency adjudication cuts against concerns that private enforcement in 
administrative courts will result in overdeterrence.250 
Nevertheless, enhancing private rights of action and 
eliminating exclusive agency control over enforcement would likely 
increase the number of administrative proceedings before the 
agency.251 If the agency must review a large number of adjudicatory 
decisions, it will face difficulty bringing consistency to its 
interpretation of the law, undermining a coherent and consistent 
national policy.252 Thus, there is a danger in oversupplementing the 
resources of public enforcers in administrative courts. The more cases 
on the agency’s docket, the more likely the agency will struggle to 
maintain control over the meaning and application of the law. Unless 
a class action or other aggregate device is available to ensure 
consistent outcomes in similar cases,253 some of the potential benefits 
of agency adjudication will be lost.254 
In addition, if agency adjudicators have a proregulatory bias, 
enhanced private rights may exacerbate the risk of overzealous 
enforcement. Without the resource constraints that limit public 
 
 246. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. 
 247. See Carroll, supra note 40, at 864–65. 
 248. See William Funk, Close Enough for Government Work?—Using Informal Procedures for 
Imposing Administrative Penalties, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 16–19 (1993). 
 249. See Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 1696. 
 250. But as noted above, overdeterrence is possible when the agency itself is committed to 
overdeterrence and leverages the resources of private parties. 
 251. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1206 (“[P]rivate initiation rights may raise 
serious problems for regulatory administration. Successful suits could squander agency resources 
on isolated, minor controversies, thereby diverting energy from larger patterns of misconduct.”). 
 252. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 168, at 415 (“There are times when we simply have to 
learn to live with unequal justice because the alternatives are worse.”). 
 253. Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 1682. 
 254. Although rulemaking can help an agency streamline its docket prospectively, it is often 
too little, too late to handle spikes in claims. Id. at 1693–95. 
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enforcement, large numbers of private actions, and possibly even 
settlements outside of administrative proceedings, may result in 
overregulation. Thus, overdeterrence may pose a greater risk during 
some administrations than it does during others due to centralized 
control over the adjudication of enforcement actions. 
These concerns may explain why the private rights in many 
administrative schemes do not include full independent enforcement 
authority. It also suggests that it is better to enhance private 
enforcement in administrative schemes that leverage the 
informational advantages of private parties rather than their sheer 
numbers. In addition, Congress may want to require agency approval 
of private settlements to ensure they do not result in regulation 
without political accountability.  
3. Agency Tools for Mitigating the Risks of Private Enforcement 
Agencies have tools unavailable to courts to check claims that 
are duplicative, wasteful, or inconsistent with the exercise of 
reasonable enforcement discretion. Unlike federal courts, agencies are 
generally not bound by the Rules Enabling Act, which prohibits 
Article III courts from “prescrib[ing] general rules of practice and 
procedure” that “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”255 
Therefore, agencies may preclude private actions that advance 
technically valid legal claims yet are duplicative or wasteful in light of 
the agency’s overall enforcement policy.  
The danger with giving agencies the power to block private 
suits, of course, is that it threatens to obstruct private enforcement if 
the agency is captured. Moreover, suits based on novel legal theories 
are not always socially undesirable. Private parties often push the law 
in new directions that eventually come to enjoy broad public support. 
Therefore, an agency “veto” over private enforcement is preferable to 
agency “licensing,”256 as it will make capture more transparent. In 
addition, agencies should provide good reasons for blocking arguably 
meritorious suits on the grounds that they are inconsistent with the 
agency’s enforcement priorities. 
That said, blocking duplicative suits raises fewer concerns with 
capture because the agency is bringing its own enforcement action. 
Thus, if Congress provides private parties robust enforcement rights, 
it should also consider giving agencies the power to check redundant 
 
 255. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). 
 256. Engstrom, supra note 12, at 679–80. 
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private actions when the agency is, in fact, enforcing. The agency 
could then require private parties to participate in similar public 
actions or create an aggregate proceeding in which the agency pursues 
the action on behalf of a class of beneficiaries.257 If the agency takes up 
the complaint, the private party would have the option of joining the 
agency’s enforcement action. If the agency declines to pursue the 
claim, the private party would have the option of pursuing 
nonduplicative enforcement actions.258  
Giving private parties greater enforcement rights in 
administrative proceedings may inevitably decrease agency control 
over their caseloads. Whether the benefits are worth the costs depends 
on whether inaction due to capture is an acute problem in the 
particular administrative scheme. In some cases, more limited private 
rights to file complaints, trigger investigations, or join public actions 
will provide enough benefits of private enforcement without a stronger 
check on capture. Even a requirement that agencies respond to 
complaints in writing will increase the transparency of agency policy. 
But the pervasive use of enforcement discretion to underenforce may 
call for enhancing private enforcement in some contexts.  
B. Enhancing Private Rights to Check Agency Inaction 
Private enforcement is an additional tool agency designers can 
use to address political or interest group capture of agency 
enforcement. But it is not costless. Moving from theory to practice, 
this Section considers several recent cases of nonenforcement and 
weighs the advantages and disadvantages of enhancing private rights 
of action. 
1. The Challenge of Political Nonenforcement 
The growth over the last several decades of what then-
Professor Elena Kagan called “presidential administration” has put 
increasing pressure on the ability of agencies to implement their 
statutory mandates.259 The power of the executive to “course correct” 
 
 257. See Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 149, at 2003–06, 2035–36. 
 258. Several environmental statutes, for example, allow the Environmental Protection 
Agency to displace private enforcement actions in federal court only if it brings its own public 
enforcement action. See Engstrom, supra note 12, at 650–51, 651 n.115 (listing major federal 
environmental statutes, such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, that have “citizen suit” 
provisions). 
 259. Kagan, supra note 25. 
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within broad statutory parameters without awaiting congressional 
action can have significant normative benefits.260 But presidents of 
both parties are frequently tempted to use the levers of government to 
thwart mandates they cannot repeal through the legislative process.261 
This often takes the form of presidential appointees adopting either 
nonenforcement or particularly selective enforcement policies at the 
agencies they lead.262  
 
 260. See, e.g., id. at 2331–39 (explaining that presidential control over administration 
promotes accountability by enhancing transparency and establishing an “electoral link between 
the public and the bureaucracy”); Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 212, at 381–85 (identifying the 
disadvantages of generally applicable laws but still recognizing that it is “more efficient for the 
Executive to define categories of cases that represent poor fits with the law than to repeatedly 
adjudicate common issues in each individual case”). The legislative process is often slow, 
laborious, and particularly ill-suited to making incremental changes in policy when there is little 
consensus around broader policy objectives. See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and 
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 
75 VA. L. REV. 431, 435–40 (1989) (modeling the structural difficulties Congress faces when 
seeking to respond to agency action); see also McCubbins et al., supra note 232 (using the 
principal-agent framework to analyze congressional control of the administrative state). 
 261. See Kagan, supra note 25, at 2347 (noting how “presidential administration might 
displace the preferences of a prior (rather than of the contemporaneous) Congress by interpreting 
statutes inconsistently with their drafters’ objectives”). For example, the Obama administration 
instituted the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program after the Development, 
Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (“DREAM”) Act died in the 112th Congress. See Julia 
Preston & John H. Cushman, Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, June 16, 2012, at A1; Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., 
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States 
as Children (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-
discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/MSQ5-RDCC]. 
Additionally, the Trump administration stepped up efforts to undermine the Affordable Care Act 
through executive action after repeal efforts failed in Congress. See Peter Sullivan & Rachel 
Roubein, Critics See Trump Sabotage on ObamaCare, HILL (Oct. 7, 2017), https://thehill.com/ 
policy/healthcare/354308-trump-sabotage-seen-on-obamacare [https://perma.cc/9JT6-D6GA] 
(describing how the Trump administration undermined enrollment, cut subsidies, and limited 
coverage).  
 262. For a collection of examples of nonenforcement from the Reagan, Bush, and Obama 
administrations, see Zachary S. Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1119, 
1125–36 (2015). Such political capture of agency adjudication may worsen in the wake of the 
Supreme Court’s opinion last term in Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), which held that ALJs 
are officers of the United States who must be appointed under the Appointments Clause by the 
president or the heads of the departments. See also Exec. Order No. 13843, 83 Fed Reg. 32,755 
(July 10, 2018) (excepting ALJs from the competitive hiring rules and examinations of the OPM). 
Classifying ALJs as “inferior officers” for purposes of appointment might also result in them 
being removable at will. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 
477, 484 (2010) (holding that more than one layer of for-cause removal protections violates the 
Vesting and Take Care Clauses of Article II). But see id. at 507 n.10 (suggesting that ALJs may 
be distinguishable from Public Company Accounting Oversight Board members due to their 
adjudicative functions). Although the relationship between ALJ independence and the 
Appointments Clause is beyond the scope of this Article, independent decisionmakers are 
important to controlling overzealous public enforcement and enabling meaningful private 
enforcement in agency adjudication.  
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Congressional enacting coalitions rely heavily on judicial 
review initiated by private parties to keep agencies in line with their 
statutory mandates.263 To date, judicial review has done a decent job 
checking the use of rulemaking and enforcement actions to push 
agencies beyond what the law allows.264 Due to the presumption 
against the reviewability of enforcement decisions,265 however, judicial 
review is less effective at checking agency decisions not to enforce.266  
This weakness in judicial review has profound implications for 
agency adjudication. When agency adjudication relies heavily on 
public enforcement, with few private rights, the agency has broad 
discretion regarding which complaints to pursue.267 Placing control of 
enforcement in the hands of an agency virtually eliminates the ability 
of courts to check agency inaction.268 Inasmuch as Congress uses 
agency adjudication to provide parties with relief unavailable in 
court,269 such inaction is generally inconsistent with the agency’s 
underlying statutory mandate. 
2. Inside Agency Nonenforcement 
Increased presidential control over the administrative state 
and the use of nonenforcement to obstruct statutory mandates raises 
the question of whether agency designers should enhance private 
rights in administrative programs. Consider the following recent 
examples of agency nonenforcement:  
• After the Trump administration took office, the Department 
of Education (“DOE”) stopped pursuing enforcement actions 
 
 263. McCubbins et al., supra note 232, at 271–74. 
 264. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 
(1983) (vacating a rule that undermined the statutory goal of improving motor vehicle safety); 
Barkow, supra note 12, at 1139 n.37 (“[C]urrent doctrine does a better job checking affirmative 
agency action than addressing ‘excessive agency inaction.’ ” (quoting Brett McDonnell & Daniel 
Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1646 (2011))).  
 265. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832–33 (1985). 
 266. Barkow, supra note 12, at 1131–34; Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory 
Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1646 (2011); Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 27, at 1405; Stewart 
& Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1205–06. 
 267. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1205–06 (discussing deferential review of agency 
decisions not to enforce). 
 268. See supra notes 89–99 and accompanying text. Even the CFPB under former director 
Richard Cordray, which was known for its vigorous pursuit of consumer protection and public 
responsiveness, was accused of ignoring certain complaints filed by consumers. See Matthew 
Goldstein & Stacy Cowley, Casting Wall Street as Victim, Trump Leads Charge on Deregulation, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2017, at B1 (describing criticism of the CFPB’s complaint process as “a 
portal to nowhere”). 
 269. See supra Section II.A. 
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against schools accused of misrepresentation or fraud by 
student borrowers.270 Student borrowers may seek relief 
from repayment of their federal loans from the Department, 
but DOE’s Student Aid Enforcement Unit has exclusive 
authority to initiate administrative proceedings against the 
schools to recoup the money.271 For nearly a year, DOE did 
not adjudicate a single borrower defense claim by students 
defrauded by their schools and the backlog of claims grew to 
more than eighty-seven thousand.272 In the meantime, 
student borrowers are forced to make payments on loans 
they assert they do not owe, attempt to negotiate a 
deferment or forbearance to temporarily relieve them of the 
obligation of making payments or default on their loans and 
become subject to coercive collection mechanisms, including 
wage garnishment and tax offsets.273 The Department 
began offering partial relief to the student borrowers in 
December 2017, but to date the Trump administration has 
 
 270. Letter from Acting Under Sec’y James Manning to Senator Richard J. Durbin (July 
7, 2017) https://www.durbin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/17-010570%20Durbin%20Outgoing.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YDF9-8F5P]; Yan Cao & Tariq Habash, College Complaints Unmasked: 99 
Percent of Student Fraud Claims Concern For-Profit Colleges, CENTURY FOUND. (Nov. 8, 2017), 
https://tcf.org/content/report/college-complaints-unmasked [https://perma.cc/7NSQ-FAPA]; 
Danielle Douglas-Gabrielle, Trump Administration is Sitting on Tens of Thousands of Student 
Debt Forgiveness Claims, WASH. POST (July 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/grade-point/wp/2017/07/27/trump-administration-is-sitting-on-tens-of-thousands-of-student 
-debt-forgiveness-claims [https://perma.cc/H6LC-ZCEL]. Under the Higher Education Act of 
1965, student borrowers may seek discharge of certain federal student loans based on any “act or 
omission of the school attended by the student that would give rise to a cause of action against 
the school under applicable State law.” 34 C.F.R. § 685.206(c)(1) (2018). Congress directed the 
Secretary of Education in 1993 to “specify in regulations which acts or omissions of an institution 
of higher education a borrower may assert as a defense to repayment of” certain federal loans. 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (2012) (codified at 
20 U.S.C. § 1087e(h) (2012)). The Secretary promulgated the regulations the following year. 
William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,664 (Dec. 1, 1994) (codified at 34 
C.F.R. § 685.100). In 2016, the Secretary amended the regulations to provide more efficient, 
consistent, and fair procedures for resolving student-borrower applications for relief. Amended 
William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 75,926 (Nov. 1, 2016). But after a 
change in administration, the new Secretary of Education suspended the new regulations, 
William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 49,114 (Oct. 24, 2017), and stopped 
processing existing applications for loan discharges.  
 271. 81 Fed. Reg. at 75,926 (“Individual claims will be decided in a non-adversarial process 
managed by a Department official, and group claims would be brought by the Department 
against the school, not by students.”).  
 272. See Cao & Habash, supra note 270, at fig.2, n.53.  
 273. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief & Demand for Jury Trial at 6, 118–22, Carr v. 
Devos (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 17-cv-8790) (providing an example of a student borrower whose 
student loans had been placed in forbearance by the Department of Education’s loan servicer 
after the student had asserted complete defenses to the repayment of her loans). 
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not pursued any actions against the schools accused of 
misrepresentations or fraud.274 
• Barely forty-eight hours after President Trump named 
Mick Mulvaney Acting Director of the CFPB in November 
2017, its lawyers began pulling back the agency’s 
enforcement efforts.275 The CFPB is responsible for 
enforcing prohibitions on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts 
and practices in connection with consumer financial 
products and services.276 Under the previous director, the 
agency had used consumer complaints to inform its 
investigations, enforcement actions, and rulemaking. But 
the CFPB has exclusive authority to pursue administrative 
enforcement actions before an ALJ.277 Although it is too 
early to assess the full scope of the rollback, Mr. Mulvaney 
announced, “This place will be different, under my 
leadership and under whoever follows me.” Mr. Mulvaney 
had previously denounced the agency he now leads as a 
“ ‘sad, sick’ example of bureaucracy gone amok.”278  
In each case, imbuing the administrative scheme with private 
rights of action, paired with a requirement that agencies give 
reasoned explanations for changes in policy,279 would reduce political 
capture or at least make it more transparent. If student borrowers had 
the right to file complaints directly against schools that defrauded 
them and to receive a decision from an administrative judge on the 
record of an evidentiary hearing, the regulatory scheme would 
continue to function when the DOE was not pursuing its own 
enforcement actions. The administrative judge would follow existing 
policy until changed by a new administration through rulemaking or 
adjudication. If the Secretary of Education wished to preclude these 
claims she would have to offer reasons on the record. The Secretary 
would be more likely to refrain from such action unless she had good 
 
 274. See Cao & Habash, supra note 270. It has not gone unnoticed that both the President 
and the Secretary of Education presiding over the shutdown have had stakes in for-profit 
schools, which constitute virtually all of the complaints in the backlog. 
 275. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Stacy Cowley, Trump Appointee Moves to Yank Out a 
Consumer Watchdog’s Teeth, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2017, at B1. 
 276. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(2) (2012). 
 277. 12 C.F.R. § 1081.200 (2018). 
 278. Silver-Greenberg & Cowley, supra note 275. 
 279. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (stating that the 
agency must give good reasons for the changed policy); Staszewski, supra note 193, at 1281 (“The 
practice of reason-giving further limits the scope of available discretion over time . . . .”). 
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reasons to pursue them. And if the Secretary changed policy using 
either rulemaking or adjudication, the private claimant could seek 
judicial review in federal court. Student borrowers would not have to 
clear the hurdle of Heckler v. Chaney when faced with DOE 
inaction.280 
Similarly, if consumers had the right to pursue enforcement 
actions against financial institutions in the CFPB, the Director of the 
CFPB would have to provide reasons for rejecting their claims, 
perhaps explaining why a favorable ALJ’s decision under the old 
policy was inconsistent with his understanding of the relief afforded 
under the law.  
Of course, it would be only a matter of time before a new 
administration determined to roll back enforcement implemented a 
narrower interpretation of the law, either through rulemaking or 
adjudication. It is reasonable for administrations to choose different 
enforcement priorities and interpret legal ambiguities in light of their 
policy goals. But instead of simply sitting on complaints, the agency 
would need to use rulemaking or adjudication to explain why the 
private parties should not prevail. This, after all, is the heart of 
adjudication: a decision based on reasoned proofs.281  
Moreover, changes in policy through rulemaking or 
adjudication would allow judicial review to serve as a check on new 
policies inconsistent with any reasonable understanding of the 
statute.282 Thus, private rights of action can enhance the transparency 
of changes in policy and facilitate judicial review as a check on 
changes that undermine the statutory goals. 
 
 280. The case of student borrowers also suggests that agencies respond to even weak 
procedural rights of private parties. Although the DOE sat on student-borrower defense claims 
for nearly a year, it eventually adjudicated their claims. Nevertheless, the information they 
provided the agency concerning violations by for-profit schools did not compel the agency to bring 
its own enforcement actions. Moreover, the DOE’s unwillingness to discharge the full amount of 
the student borrower’s loans may have stemmed from the fact that the DOE would not recoup 
the taxpayer’s money from the schools in enforcement actions. 
 281. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364–65 
(1978).  
 282. Greater private enforcement rights would also help mitigate the related problem of 
regulatory capture, which may be a more acute risk in specialized public enforcement. Minzner, 
supra note 109, at 2139–40.  
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Consider a third example from the current administration: 
• After a change in political control of the National Labor 
Relations Board (“NLRB”) in December 2017, the Board 
rapidly changed its position on “several Obama-era NLRB 
rulings that made it easier for workers to unionize and 
defend against employer labor law violations.”283 The Board 
issued lengthy opinions explaining its reversals in three 
pending cases.284  
Unlike the prior examples, the Board’s decisions not to grant 
relief are subject to judicial review.285 Thus, aggrieved parties can 
make their case to a federal court that the agency’s changes in policy 
are arbitrary and capricious. Meanwhile, the Board will continue to 
grant relief in cases that have merit based on its interpretation of law. 
This is not to suggest the NLRB is a model administrative agency. It 
has been criticized for many reasons.286 Moreover, the Board issued 
these decisions in cases brought by the Board’s prior general counsel. 
The new general counsel could adopt a policy of non- or selective 
nonenforcement with highly deferential review.287 But the decisions 
illustrate the benefits of agencies ruling against complaints in 
 
 283. Trump NLRB Majority Moves Fast to Reverse Obama-era Decisions, NWLABORPRESS 
(Jan. 3, 2018), https://nwlaborpress.org/2018/01/trump-nlrb-majority-moves-fast-to-reverse-
obama-era-decisions [https://perma.cc/992A-LPJ6] (describing three reversals in December 2017). 
 284. See, e.g., Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. 156 (2017) (thirty-five-page 
opinion overruling Browning-Ferris and “return[ing] to the principles governing joint-employer 
status that existed prior to that decision,” along with a twelve-page dissent); Boeing Co., 365 
N.L.R.B. 154 (2017) (twenty-three-page opinion creating a new test for evaluating employers’ 
work rules, along with twenty-one pages of dissenting opinions). The ALJ decisions contrary to 
the Board’s decisions are also part of the record before the court on review. Universal Camera 
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 492 (1951).  
 285. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2012): 
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board . . . may obtain a review of such 
order in any United States court of appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor 
practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person 
resides or transacts business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia . . . . 
But see Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of “Hiding the Ball”: NLRB Policymaking and the 
Failure of Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387, 404 (1995) (arguing that “the agency’s practice of 
hiding behind multifactored tests instead of acknowledging well-defined rules of decision makes 
judicial review of its policymaking much more difficult”). 
 286. See, e.g., Fisk & Malamud, supra note 96, at 2019 (criticizing the Board’s lack of access 
to social science data and analysis developed by its own staff, resulting in “a formalistic style of 
adjudicatory reasoning that packages questions of policy as questions of law”). 
 287. Magill & Vermeule, supra note 227, at 1059 n.74 (citing Rosenblum, supra note 194); see 
also Kevin Frekng, Senate Confirms General Counsel for Labor Board, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 8, 2017), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2017-11-08/senate-confirms-general-counsel-for-
labor-board [https://perma.cc/BZC2-S53S]. 
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adjudication rather than blocking them using nonenforcement. 
Changes in policy through adjudication enhance the transparency of 
public policy and facilitate judicial review. Without strong private 
rights of action, injured parties are left to challenge nonenforcement 
as an abdication of enforcement responsibility or an unreasonable 
delay under the APA, which are notoriously difficult claims to win.288  
Nevertheless, enhancing private rights to check 
nonenforcement has costs. If the agency must adjudicate a large 
number of private complaints, it may have difficulty implementing a 
consistent policy and struggle with caseload volatility. In addition, a 
proregulatory agency may leverage private resources to overenforce. 
These risks suggest that enhanced private rights might be more 
appropriate for student-borrower claims against schools charged with 
misrepresentations than consumer claims against businesses charged 
with unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices in connection 
with consumer financial products and services. Although the number 
of student borrowers is quite large, it is dwarfed by the pool of 
potential complaints regarding consumer financial products and 
services.289 In addition, while Americans typically take out educational 
loans at a distinct time in their lives, they engage in consumer 
financial transactions nearly every day over the course of their entire 
lives. Given the CFPB’s broad mandate to protect consumers “from 
unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices and from 
discrimination,”290 one can imagine a massive number of private 
enforcement actions if the agency provided an inexpensive and 
informal forum for these claims.291 Student-borrower complaints, by 
contrast, are more focused: 98.6 percent of the complaints received by 
DOE through 2017 involved for-profit colleges and three-fourths of all 
claims were against schools owned by a for-profit entity.292 Thus, 
increased private enforcement for student-borrower claims should be 
easier for the agency to manage than private rights of action against 
 
 288. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 27, at 1448 & n.15. 
 289. Forty-four million Americans currently have student loan debt as compared to 80 
million mortgages, 106 million auto loans, and 192 million credit card holders. In its first three 
years alone, the CFPB handled more than 558,800 consumer complaints regarding mortgages, 
debt collection practices, credit reporting, credit cards, consumer loans, student loans, and other 
such unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices. CONSUMER RESPONSE, supra note 129. The 
DOE received just under 100,000 student complaints during roughly the same period. Cao & 
Habash, supra note 270. 
 290. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(2) (2012). 
 291. See supra note 289. 
 292. Cao & Habash, supra note 270.  
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financial institutions for unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and 
practices.  
The question of manageability may also explain the greater 
role of private parties in enforcement by the NLRB, which hears a 
narrower category of cases than either the DOE or the CFPB.293 The 
NLRB falls along the middle of the public-private enforcement 
continuum.294 But enhancing private rights in the NLRB should be 
manageable if Congress chose to highlight changes in policy using 
nonenforcement and subject them to greater judicial review. 
C. Choosing a Forum for Private Enforcement 
The role of private enforcement in agency adjudication opens 
up new lines of inquiry regarding the choice of forum for private rights 
of action. Although deserving of greater study than possible in this 
Article, this Section offers some preliminary thoughts.  
Procedural rights in administrative courts encourage private 
parties to supplement the information resources of agencies in 
enforcement, adjudication, and rulemaking more directly than private 
enforcement in federal court. Thus, some minimum procedural rights 
to file complaints, trigger investigations, and obtain reasoned (even if 
informal) decisions will likely be appropriate in many administrative 
schemes. 
When deciding whether to create private rights in an agency, 
federal court, or both, Congress should consider the importance of 
access to an informal and inexpensive forum for dispute resolution. 
Private rights are less important for checking capture in agency 
adjudication when private enforcement is available in federal court. 
Nevertheless, if the costs and formalities of federal court are an 
impediment to private enforcement, Congress may want to utilize an 
agency forum. Congress often creates administrative schemes because 
of perceived difficulties of achieving its goals using the courts.295 
In addition, Congress should consider the importance of 
uniformity, regulatory coherence, and political accountability in 
implementing policy. Placing private rights in agency adjudication 
mitigates the central critique of private enforcement in federal court—
that private parties will disrupt a carefully calibrated, politically 
accountable public enforcement scheme. Uniformity and coherence in 
 
 293. See supra note 289. 
 294. See supra Table 2. 
 295. See supra Section II.A. 
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adjudication are important when enforcement is one piece of an 
integrated regulatory program. This weighs in favor of DOE 
adjudication of student-borrower complaints against schools because 
the DOE is responsible for disbursing and discharging the student 
borrowers’ federal loans. 
Agency adjudication of private actions also facilitates a uniform 
national interpretation of the law accountable to the political 
branches, while federal courts allow issues to percolate over time. 
Political accountability may be more important when Congress 
legislates broad statutory commands subject to diverse interpretations 
or is uncertain about the direction of policy and less important when 
Congress legislates with specificity. But even with broad statutory 
mandates, Congress may want the greater long-term stability afforded 
by federal courts if it is concerned with how changes in administration 
will impact reliance interests.296  
Finally, Congress should be cautious of supplementing agency 
resources with private rights where there are large pools of potential 
claimants who might overwhelm the agency’s docket and increase the 
risk of backlogs, inconsistent decisionmaking, or overenforcement. If 
Congress is concerned that robust private enforcement will threaten 
the consistency and accountability of agency adjudication, then it may 
make more sense to place private rights of action in federal court and 
accept some risk of conflict between public and private enforcement 
regimes.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article begins a conversation regarding the relationship 
between public and private enforcement in agency adjudication. It 
shows that administrative enforcement is not merely another form of 
public enforcement, only in a friendlier forum. Contrary to the 
prevailing perception, private enforcement is deeply embedded in the 
design of federal regulatory programs. In addition, this Article 
provides a framework for thinking about how best to structure 
administrative enforcement schemes to leverage the resources of 
private parties in support of public policy. 
Private enforcement in agency adjudication has important 
implications for our understanding of the relationship between public 
and private enforcement regimes more generally. Private enforcement 
is often thought of as a way to avoid the use of a strong state 
 
 296. Stephenson, supra note 199, at 1058–59. 
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bureaucracy in a political culture distrustful of “big government.”297 
Under this view, each mode of enforcement generally proceeds in 
federal court on its own track. Yet private enforcement in agency 
adjudication challenges this view. Beyond simply providing a 
nongovernmental enforcement mechanism, private enforcement is 
critical to agencies’ ability to accomplish their missions. Private 
enforcement facilitates access to regulatory remedies, enhances the 
information of government regulators, and holds them accountable to 
their statutory mandates.  
Progressive and New Deal advocates of the regulatory state 
feared that judicialization would hobble the administrative process.298 
With the passage of the APA, judicialized procedures became well 
established in formal adjudication and for a time made significant 
inroads into rulemaking. But there has been a turn away from 
judicialized procedures in recent decades as agencies, courts, and 
scholars have made greater use of rulemaking and informal guidance, 
finding judicial-like procedures burdensome, time consuming, and 
ineffective. Yet far from hobbling the administrative process, 
judicialized procedural rights for private parties may in some cases be 
essential to protecting the goals Congress seeks to achieve with 
regulatory agencies. Indeed, private rights in agency adjudication may 
be especially important today, as presidents increasingly use 
enforcement policies to roll back or amend statutory mandates outside 
the legislative process. 
  
 
 297. KAGAN, supra note 54, at 15–16. 
 298. See 86 CONG. REC. 13,943 (1940) (message of the President accompanying a veto of an 
early version of the Administrative Procedure Act, in which agency procedure was highly 
judicialized); Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfication with the Administration of 
Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729 (1906) (identifying the shortcomings of judicial administration 
characterized by an adversarial process). 
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APPENDIX A 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT RIGHTS IN  
ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS 
 
 A. B. C. D. E. F. G. 
Administrative 
Court 
Agency 
Enforcement299 
Exclusive 
Agency 
Enforcement300 
Private 
Complaints301 
Agency 
Investigation302 
Private  
Parties to 
Enforcement303 
Private 
Right  
of 
Action304 
Rules of 
Practice 
and 
Procedure 
Commodity 
Futures Trading 
Commission—
Office of 
Proceedings 
X X X  X X 17 C.F.R. 
Part 10 
Consumer 
Financial 
Protection 
Bureau— 
Office of 
Administrative 
Adjudication 
X X     12 C.F.R. 
Part 1081 
Department of 
Commerce—
Office of the 
Assistant 
Secretary for 
Export 
Administration 
X X X    15 C.F.R. 
Part 766 
 
 299. The applicable administrative court hears cases in which the relevant agency has 
enforcement responsibilities. The agency’s enforcement responsibilities might include one or 
more of the following: reviewing and investigating complaints, attempting to settle disputes 
between the parties, acting as a gatekeeper for private complaints, or exercising exclusive control 
over enforcement actions adjudicated by the agency.   
 300. The administrative court hears claims in which the agency has exclusive authority 
whether to pursue an enforcement action requiring an evidentiary hearing. However, other 
nongovernmental parties besides the respondent may be able to obtain formal party status in 
such cases. 
 301. The regulatory scheme provides private parties with the right to file complaints and 
requires the agency to review the complaints in at least some case types. The agency’s review 
may or may not include an independent investigation of the charges in the complaint. 
 302. The regulatory scheme provides for an agency investigation of the merits of some types 
of complaints. 
 303. The regulatory scheme allows private parties other than respondents to participate in 
some types of enforcement actions. 
 304. The regulatory scheme allows private parties to pursue some claims with or without the 
participation of the agency. 
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 A. B. C. D. E. F. G. 
Administrative 
Court 
Agency 
Enforcement299 
Exclusive 
Agency 
Enforcement300 
Private 
Complaints301 
Agency 
Investigation302 
Private  
Parties to 
Enforcement303 
Private 
Right  
of 
Action304 
Rules of 
Practice 
and 
Procedure 
Department of 
Commerce—
U.S. Coast 
Guard Office of 
Administration 
X X X    15 C.F.R. 
Part 766 
Department of 
Energy—Office 
of Hearings and 
Appeals 
X X X X X X 10 C.F.R. 
Part 1003 
Department of 
Energy—Office 
of the Secretary 
X X X X X X 10 C.F.R. 
Part 708 
Department of 
Health and 
Human 
Services—
Departmental 
Appeals Board 
X X     21 C.F.R. 
Part 17 
Department of 
Housing and 
Urban 
Development—
Office of the 
Secretary 
X X X X   24 C.F.R. 
Part 26 
Department of 
Justice— 
Office of the 
Chief 
Administrative 
Hearing Officer 
X X X X X  28 C.F.R. 
Part 68 
Department of 
Justice— 
Office of the 
Chief 
Immigration 
Judge 
X X     8 C.F.R. 
Part 
1003, 
subpart C 
Department of 
Labor—
Administrative 
Review Board 
X X X X X X 29 C.F.R. 
Part 7 
Department of 
Labor—Benefits 
Review Board 
X  X X X X 20 C.F.R. 
Part 802 
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 A. B. C. D. E. F. G. 
Administrative 
Court 
Agency 
Enforcement299 
Exclusive 
Agency 
Enforcement300 
Private 
Complaints301 
Agency 
Investigation302 
Private  
Parties to 
Enforcement303 
Private 
Right  
of 
Action304 
Rules of 
Practice 
and 
Procedure 
Department of 
Labor—Board  
of Alien Labor 
Certification 
Appeals 
X X     20 C.F.R. 
Part 656 
Department of 
Labor—Office of 
Administrative 
Law Judges 
X X X X X X 29 C.F.R. 
Part 18 
Department of 
Treasury—
Office of 
Administrative 
Law Judges 
X X     27 C.F.R. 
Part 71 
Equal 
Employment 
Opportunity 
Commission—
Office of Federal 
Operations 
X  X 
 
X X X 29 C.F.R. 
Part 1603 
Environmental 
Protection 
Agency—
Environmental 
Appeals Board 
X X X X X X 40 C.F.R. 
Part 22  
Environmental 
Protection 
Agency— 
Office of 
Administrative 
Law Judges 
X X X X X X 40 C.F.R. 
Part 22  
Federal Election 
Commission 
X X X X   11 C.F.R. 
Part 111 
Federal 
Maritime 
Commission—
Office of 
Administrative 
Law Judges 
X  X X X X 46 C.F.R. 
Part 502 
Federal Mine 
Safety and 
Health Review 
Commission 
X X X X X 
 
X 29 C.F.R. 
Part 2700 
Sant’Ambrogio_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/26/2019  2:13 PM 
2019] PRIVATE ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT  499 
 
 A. B. C. D. E. F. G. 
Administrative 
Court 
Agency 
Enforcement299 
Exclusive 
Agency 
Enforcement300 
Private 
Complaints301 
Agency 
Investigation302 
Private  
Parties to 
Enforcement303 
Private 
Right  
of 
Action304 
Rules of 
Practice 
and 
Procedure 
Federal Mine 
Safety and 
Health Review 
Commission—
Office of 
Administrative 
Law Judges 
X X X X X X 29 C.F.R. 
Part 2700 
Federal Trade 
Commission 
X X X X X  16 C.F.R. 
Part 3 
Federal Trade 
Commission—
Office of 
Administrative 
Law Judges  
X X X X X  16 C.F.R. 
Part 3 
National Labor 
Relations Board 
X X X X X  29 C.F.R. 
Part 102 
National Labor 
Relations 
Board—Division 
of Judges 
X X X X X  29 C.F.R. 
Part 102 
National Labor 
Relations 
Board— 
Regional Offices 
X X X X X  29 C.F.R. 
Part 102 
National 
Transportation 
Safety Board 
X X   X  49 C.F.R. 
Part 821 
National 
Transportation 
Safety Board—
Office of ALJs 
X X   X  49 C.F.R. 
Part 821 
Occupational 
Safety and 
Health Review 
Commission 
X X   X  29 C.F.R. 
Part 2200 
Occupational 
Safety and 
Health Review 
Commission—
Office of the 
Chief  
X X   X  29 C.F.R. 
Part 2200 
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 A. B. C. D. E. F. G. 
Administrative 
Court 
Agency 
Enforcement299 
Exclusive 
Agency 
Enforcement300 
Private 
Complaints301 
Agency 
Investigation302 
Private  
Parties to 
Enforcement303 
Private 
Right  
of 
Action304 
Rules of 
Practice 
and 
Procedure 
Surface 
Transportation 
Board 
X  X X X X 49 C.F.R. 
Parts 
1111 & 
1122 
United States 
International 
Trade 
Commission 
X  X X X X 19 C.F.R. 
Part 210 
United States 
International 
Trade 
Commission—
Office of 
Administrative 
Law Judges 
X  X X X X 19 C.F.R. 
Part 210 
Totals 34 28 25 22 25 15  
 
